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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the determinants of divestitures, the impact of divestitures on short-
term firm value and the determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. The study is 
based on a sample of 46 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) between 2000 and 2014. Logit regressions found CEO Turnover, a measure of 
corporate focus and Return on Assets (ROA), a measure of corporate efficiency, to be the 
only statistically significant determinants of divestitures in South Africa. However, Sales 
growth, Return on Equity (ROE), Debt to Total Assets (D-t-A), Debt to Equity (D-t-E), the 
current ratio, and the interest coverage ratio did not possess statistical significance as 
determinants of divestitures in South Africa. The study also investigated the impact of 
divestitures on short-term shareholder wealth and found that divestitures have a statistically 
significant positive impact on short-term firm value in South Africa. Finally, the study also 
investigated the determinants of divestiture returns. The cross-sectional regression based on 
the full sample of divesting firms found that leverage has a statistically significant effect on 
divestiture returns in South Africa; however, firm size and efficiency do not have a 
statistically significant effect on divestiture returns. However, the study also separated the 
portfolio of divesting firms into subsamples to further understand the determinants of 
divestiture returns in South Africa. Analyses of subsamples reported that larger firms report 
superior abnormal returns than smaller firms, firms with lower levels of efficiency report 
superior abnormal returns than firms with higher levels of efficiency, and highly-levered 
firms report superior abnormal returns than lower-levered firms in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Divestitures, Event Study, Cumulative Abnormal Returns, South Africa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction to Divestitures 
Brauer (2006) defines divestitures as adjustments to ownership and the firm’s business 
portfolio structure (Lee & Madhavan, 2010). These adjustments can be completed via spin-
offs, equity carve-outs, a split up or the complete sale of a firm’s business units or assets 
(Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Desai & Jain, 1999; Markides, 1992). 
 
Divestitures occur either voluntarily (voluntary divestitures) or through external pressures 
(involuntary divestitures). Voluntary divestitures are a predetermined decision taken by 
managers and shareholders of the firm (Søgaard & Nielsen, 2011). The decision would result 
in the firm making an announcement that it intends to transfer a portion of its resources in 
exchange for financial considerations (Alexander, Benson & Kampmeyer, 1984). In contrast, 
involuntary divestitures occur when the firm is forced to transfer ownership of its resources 
as a result of external pressures.  External pressures may come in the form of changes in 
legislation that affect the operating environment in which the firm operates. External 
pressures may also be instituted by the firm’s stakeholders during periods when the firm is 
unable to meet any financial obligations. However, Boudreaux (1975) argues that involuntary 
divestitures do not possess the same benefits to shareholder wealth as those of voluntary 
divestitures (Søgaard & Nielsen, 2011).  
 
Firms use divestitures as a process which reduces their operating activities into a narrower set 
of business holdings. The most common forms of divestitures that firms can use to reduce 
their operating activities are sell-offs, spin-offs and equity carve-outs (Fogh, 2009). However, 
spin-offs and sell-offs are the most popular forms of divestitures in South Africa (Nichols, 
Rosenberg, Majoni & Mukanjari, 2014). Therefore, the effects of voluntary sell-offs and 
spin-offs on shareholder wealth were investigated for the purposes of this study. Sell-offs 
often occur through a sale of peripheral (non-core, unrelated) assets. Warusawitharana (2008) 
states that sell-offs involve a transfer of ownership rights by the selling firm, in exchange for 
cash considerations or securities from the acquiring firm (Dahlum & Tai, 2015). In contrast, 
spin-offs often result in the establishment of a separate and independent firm. Spin-offs 
would involve an exchange in ownership rights with no cash flow implications to the 
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acquiring firm. This exchange would occur through a distribution of shares (on a pro-rata 
basis) by the selling firm (Afshar, Taffler & Sudarsanam, 1992).  
 
1.2 Background and Motivation 
Prior to the 1980s firms grew in size and complexity as a result of previous M&A activity 
related to empire-building practices (Ferreira, 1997). Practices of building empires employed 
during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in large firms that had divisions which did not 
necessarily have a strategic fit with the overall firm (Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). Porter 
(1987) argues that M&A transactions during this period led to firms with complex corporate 
structures. These complicated corporate structures resulted in an erosion of shareholder 
wealth, rather than an enhancement in firm value. Following this period, market participants 
looked for simpler organisational structures which would lead to an enhancement in corporate 
focus (Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). Market participants believed that an increase in corporate 
focus would lead to an improvement in the firm’s value. As a result, the 1980s experienced a 
rise in divestiture activity (Berger & Ofek, 1999). This increase in divestiture activity was 
motivated by managers and shareholders who looked to refocus their efforts on core revenue-
generating segments of the firm. Managers and shareholders enhanced corporate focus in 
order to enhance firm value and divestitures gained significance as a process for value 
creation. Scholars observed this trend in capital markets and began to research the benefits 
that divestitures possess in creating value for shareholders. 
 
Research related to divestitures initially focused on the effects of voluntary divestitures on 
shareholder wealth enhancement and studies reported that divestitures have a positive impact 
on firm value (Alexander et al., 1984; Hearth & Zaima, 1984; Jain, 1985; Hite, Owers & 
Rogers, 1987). In subsequent years, scholars confirmed the findings of initial studies, 
reporting that divestitures have a positive impact on firm value (Mulherin & Boone, 2000; 
Veld & Veld-Merkoulova, 2008; Hillier, McColgan & Werema, 2009; Sudarsanam & Qian, 
2007; Nguyen, 2013). Additionally, Kengelbach, Roos and Keienburg (2014) reported that 
divestitures continue to remain an important process in creating value for shareholders. 
Deloitte (2015) supported arguments by Kengelbach et al. (2014). This study reported that 
39% of worldwide M&A activity during 2015 involved divestitures in some form (12 701 of 
32 558 total deals). According to this report, divestiture activity in 2015 was slightly lower 
than in 2014; however, the study found that the volume of divestitures in 2015 was higher 
than divestitures completed in 2013 and 2012 (Deloitte, 2015). 
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Prior research related to divestitures has explored several areas. These include; the 
determinants of divestiture decisions, the impact of divestitures on short and long-term firm 
value and the determinants of divestiture returns. Research studying the determinants of 
divestiture decisions has identified several factors which influence the divestiture decision. 
These can be categorised as follows; increased focus (Montgomery, Thomas & Kamath, 
1984; Afshar et al., 1992; Ferreira, 1997; Berger & Ofek, 1999; Bhana, 2006; Hillier et al., 
2009), financial performance measures (John & Ofek, 1995; Daley, Mehrotra & Sivakumar., 
1997; Berger & Ofek, 1999; Bhana, 2006; Hillier et al., 2009), company-specific factors 
(John & Ofek, 1995; Daley et al., 1997; Berger & Ofek, 1999; Bhana, 2006), corporate 
governance (Owen, Shi & Yawson, 2010) and the influence of leverage on divestiture 
decisions (Bhana 2006; Nguyen, 2013). 
  
Research studying the impact of divestitures on shareholder wealth initially focused on the 
impact of divestitures on short-term firm value (Alexander et al., 1984; Jain 1985). In 
subsequent years, research was conducted to better understand the impact of divestitures on 
shareholder wealth. However, studies have reported mixed results. Alexander et al. (1984;) 
Jain (1985;) Afshar et al. (1992;) Lee and Lin (2008;) Hillier et al. (2009;) Sun (2012) and 
Nguyen (2013) found that sell-offs have a positive impact on firm value. Research studying 
the impact of spin-offs on short-term firm value have also found that divestitures have a 
positive impact on short-term firm value (Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Maxwell & Rao 2003; 
Kirchmaier 2003; Veld & Veld-Merkoulova, 2004, 2008; Sin & Ariff, 2006; Sudarsanam & 
Qian, 2007; Lehtonen, 2008; Zakaria & Arnold, 2010). However, Murray (2000) conducted a 
study on the effects of spin-offs on short-term firm value in the UK, finding that spin-offs 
have a negative impact on shareholder wealth. Studies investigating the impact of divestitures 
on short-term firm value in South Africa have also reported mixed results. Blount and 
Davidson (1996;) Bhana (2006;) and Lugisani (2010) reported that divestitures have a 
positive impact on short-term firm value in South Africa. However, Joosub et al. (2017) 
reported that divestitures have a negative impact on short-term shareholder wealth in South 
Africa.  
 
Studies which have extended the event window to understand the impact of divestitures on 
long-term firm value have also reported mixed results. Cusatis et al. (1993;) Desai and Jain 
(1999;) McConnell et al. (2001;) and Veld and Veld- Merkoulova (2004) reported that 
divestitures have a positive impact on long-term firm value. However, Sudarsanam and Qian 
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(2007;) Zakaria and Arnold (2010;) and Lee and Lin (2008) found that divestitures have a 
negative impact on shareholder wealth in the long term. Studies focusing on the effects of 
divestitures on South African shareholders over the long term also reported negative returns 
(Bhana, 2004; Nichols et al., 2014). 
 
Research has also studied the determinants of divestiture returns (Hillier et al., 2009; Nguyen, 
2013; Dahlum & Tai, 2015). Hillier et al. (2009) found that firms with lower levels of 
efficiency (measured by ROA in the year prior to the divestiture announcement) reported 
superior ARs than firms with higher levels of efficiency. Nguyen (2013) reported that highly-
levered firms report superior ARs than lower-levered firms. Dahlum and Tai (2015) found 
that smaller firms report superior ARs than larger firms. However, research investigating the 
determinants of divestiture returns has primarily focussed on developed markets with 
minimal research having been conducted in South Africa 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Research investigating the impact of divestitures on firm value reveals the following; First, 
one group found that divestitures have a positive effect on short-term firm value (Miles & 
Rosenfeld; 1983; Rosenfeld, 1984; Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Bhana, 2006; Rozing, 2008; 
Hillier et al., 2009; Zakaria & Arnold, 2010; Nguyen, 2013). Another group found that 
divestitures negatively impact short-term firm value (Murray, 2000; Joosub et al., 2017). 
Possible reasons for these opposing views include different techniques used to measure 
returns. Studies have used Mean-adjusted returns (Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983; Rosenfeld, 
1984), CARs (Murray, 2000; Sin & Ariff, 2006; Lee & Linn, 2008; Rozing, 2008; Zakaria & 
Arnold, 2010; Nguyen, 2013; Nichols et al., 2014; Dahlum & Tai, 2015) and industry-
adjusted cash flow returns (Cho & Cohen, 1997).  
 
Second, a majority of these studies were conducted in developed markets such as the US, the 
UK, and Western Europe (for example Denmark, Sweden, and France). However, minimal 
research has been conducted in developing markets. Research conducted in developing 
markets includes studies conducted in Malaysia (Sin & Ariff, 2006; Zakaria & Arnold 2010) 
and Taiwan (Sun, 2012). Furthermore, research studying the impact of divestitures on firm 
value in South Africa also remains minimal and studies focussing on the impact of 
divestitures on firm value in South Africa have reported mixed results. Blount and Davidson 
(1996) and Bhana (2006) both found that divestitures have a positive impact on shareholder 
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wealth in South Africa. However, with the most recent period of these studies ending in 2001, 
these studies prove to be outdated. Lugisani (2010) and Joosub et al. (2017) conducted more 
recent studies; however, these studies reported opposing results. Lugisani (2010) reported 
that divestitures have a positive impact short-term firm value; however, this study only 
observed a period of 5 years. Joosub et al. (2017) reported that divestitures have a negative 
impact on short-term firm value; however, this study only had a small sample size of 27 
divestitures. Therefore, this study adds to the body of knowledge related to research on 
divestitures by using a longer and more recent observation period to investigate the impact of 
divestitures on short-term firm value. Additionally, Nichols et al. (2014) also conducted a 
more recent study; however, this study investigated the impact of divestitures on long-term 
firm value and found that divestitures have a negative impact on firm value.  
 
Third, a majority of research related to divestitures only focussed on the impact of 
divestitures on firm value and did not go further to study the determinants of divestiture 
returns. The few studies which investigated the determinants of divestiture returns include; 
Afshar et al. (1992;) Berger and Ofek (1999;) Haynes, Thompson and Wright (2002;) 
Lehtonen (2008;) Hillier et al. (2009;) Fogh (2009;) and Nguyen (2013). However, these 
studies were conducted in developed markets and given South Africa’s unique corporate 
environment, results obtained in this study may differ from those conducted in developed 
markets. Bhana (2006) studied the determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. 
However, with an observation period ending in 2001, this study proves to be outdated. 
Additionally, this study also uses a different process to understand the determinants of 
divestiture returns in South Africa than methods employed by Bhana (2006). Therefore, this 
study will add to previous research conducted by Bhana (2006) by using a more recent 
observation period and providing an alternative process for investigating the determinants of 
divestiture returns.  
 
South Africa possesses a unique legislative environment that governs how firms operate in 
the country. Corporate governance regulations required by the BBBEE Act and King reports 
are unique to the South African operating environment. Bhana (2006) conducted a study 
focussing on South Africa to illustrate the unique benefits of divestitures for shareholders of 
South African companies. However, with an observation period ending in 2001, this study 
proves to be outdated in light of BBBEE requirements which were amended after 2001. 
Additionally, changes in regulations governing financial markets following the 2007/8 
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financial crisis would not have been included in Bhana (2006). For example adjustments to 
economic and regulatory capital requirements instituted by legislative agencies may have had 
an impact on how firms operate. Therefore, a study of this nature may prove to be beneficial 
in understanding divestitures in South Africa. Additionally, this study differs from Bhana 
(2006) in the following ways; it determines whether firm size, leverage, and efficiency levels 
prior to the divestiture have an effect on returns related to divestitures. This is explored 
through an analysis of cross-sectional regressions using these variables. To add to an 
understanding of the determinants of divestiture returns a comparison of ARs was also 
conducted using subsamples of firms within the original sample portfolio.  
 
1.4 Research Aim and Questions 
The study aims to provide a greater understanding of divestitures in South Africa by building 
on prior knowledge. This is completed by providing an updated evaluation of the effects of 
divestitures on shareholder wealth in South Africa. To contribute to prior literature, this study 
looks to answer the following research questions by analysing companies listed on the JSE 
between 2000 and 2014:  
 
i. What are the determinants of divestitures in South Africa? 
ii. What is the short-term impact of divestitures on firm value in South Africa? 
iii. What are the determinants of short-term divestiture returns in South Africa? 
 
1.5 Contribution of the Study 
This study contributes to existing research in the following ways. First, the study adds to 
previous research related to the determinants of divestitures in South Africa conducted by 
Bhana (2006). Bhana (2006) studied divestitures up to 2000; however, this study provides a 
more recent observation period ending in 2014. Additionally, Bhana (2006) only included 
four determinants of divestitures; namely focus (measured by reductions in segments of the 
firm using dummy variables), underperformance (measured by reductions in operating 
margin of the firm by using dummy variables to measure this determinant), size (measured by 
the value of the divestiture relative to the market value of the firm in question) and a financial 
variable (measured by reductions in debt capital by using dummy variables to measure this 
determinant). Bhana (2006) studied these variables to understand their effects on divestiture 
returns by setting CARs as the dependent variable. However, this study sets “sale” which 
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represents whether a firm chose to divest or not as the dependent variable. This method is 
used to understand whether these variables had an impact on the divestiture decision and is in 
line with methods employed by Hillier et al. (2009). 
 
The independent variables for this exercise include a more comprehensive list related to the 
determinants of divestitures. Variables of sales growth and CEO Turnover (to measure 
corporate focus), ROA and ROE (to measure efficiency), D-t-A, D-t-E (to study long-term 
leverage effects) and both interest coverage and current ratios (to study short-term leverage 
effects) provide a larger variable set. Additionally, these include variables which are not 
included in Bhana (2006). This study also differs from Bhana (2006) by including an analysis 
of both univariate tests and logit regressions, as opposed to only analysing results from 
regressions. Univariate tests found CEO turnover, ROA, D-t-A, and D-t-E to be significant 
determinants of divestiture decisions. However, logit regressions only found CEO Turnover 
and ROA to be significant determinants on divestitures.  
 
Second, prior research has reported mixed results regarding the impact of divestitures on firm 
value in South Africa. Blount and Davidson (1996) and Bhana (2006) reported positive ARs 
associated with divestitures in South Africa; however, these studies are outdated. Lugisani 
(2010) also found divestitures to positively impact firm value; however, this study only 
observed a period of 5 years. Joosub et al. (2017) reported negative short-term abnormal 
returns; however, this study used a sample of 27 firms and smaller sample sizes possess less 
statistical power. Therefore, this study will add to the debate regarding the impact of 
divestitures on short-term shareholder wealth in South Africa, by providing a more up to date 
analysis of the impact of divestitures on short-term firm value. The study found that 
divestitures report CARs of 0.1317% (significant at the 0.01 level) for the 5-day (-2;+2) event 
window. Alternative event windows of 3 days (-1;+1) and 6 days (-5;0) also reported positive 
returns. These event windows reported ARs of 0.9628% (significant at the 0.10 level) and 
2.2180% (significant at the 0.10 level), respectively. Results of these event windows are 
consistent with findings of prior research conducted in South Africa (Blount & Davidson, 
1996; Bhana, 2006; Lugisani, 2010) and in other markets (Alexander et al., 1984; Afshar et 
al., 1992; Lehtonen, 2008; Fogh, 2009; Hillier et al., 2009; Zakaria & Arnold, 2010; Sun, 
2012; Dahlum & Tai, 2015) that report that divestitures have a positive impact on firm value. 
To provide a greater understanding regarding the effects of divestitures on firm value, this 
study also included a 21-day (-10;+10) event window. An extension of the event window to 
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21 days reported negative returns of 3.0148% (significant at the 0.05 level). These findings 
support Nichols et al. (2014) who found that divestitures in South Africa can result in an 
erosion of shareholder wealth over a longer period.  
 
Finally, this study updates research conducted by Bhana (2006) related to the determinants of 
divestiture returns for shareholders of South African firms. Bhana (2006) reported that 
corporate focus and previous underperformance by the firm prove to be statistically 
significant determinants of divestiture returns. However, the size of the divested unit relative 
to the firm’s market value, and the firm’s debt capital proved not to be significant 
determinants of divestiture returns. This study conducted logit regressions using CARs as the 
dependent variable and found that leverage is a statistically significant determinant of 
divestitures returns (significant at the 0.01 level); however, firm efficiency and size proved 
not to be statistically significant determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. The 
study also included a different technique for investigating the effects of firm size, efficiency, 
and leverage on divestiture returns by comparing subsamples from the portfolio of divesting 
firms. Results from the subsamples found that firms with lower levels of efficiency report 
superior ARs than firms with higher levels of efficiency (2.7919% vs. -4.8562%, significant 
at the 0.01 level). Larger firms reported superior ARs than smaller firms (2.3200% vs. -
14.4571%, significant at the 0.10 level) and highly-levered firms reported superior ARs than 
lower-levered firms (2.7796% vs. 1.6421% significant at the 0.01 level).  
 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
The rest of this study is organised as follows.  
i. Chapter 2 reviews prior literature related to divestitures, discusses the findings of 
prior studies and states hypotheses used to answer the 3 research questions of this 
study.  
ii. Chapter 3 provides definitions of the variables used in this study, details the 
techniques used to measure the determinants of divestitures, the impact of 
divestitures on firm value and the determinants of divestiture returns and discusses 
the research methods used in the study.  
iii. Chapter 4 presents and discusses findings based on the dataset.  
iv. Chapter 5 concludes the study, discusses limitations to this study and provides 
suggestions for further research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews prior literature related to corporate divestitures. Section 2.2 reviews 
literature related to the determinants of divestiture transactions. Section 2.3 presents 
empirical results from prior studies discussing the impact of divestitures on firm value. 
Section 2.4 reviews literature related to the determinants of divestiture returns. Section 2.5 
details the process adopted in this study by summarising concepts discussed in chapter two 
and states hypotheses used to answer this study’s research questions. 
 
2.2 Determinants of Divestitures 
This section discusses theories that affect divestiture decisions. Previous research is reviewed 
and the results of those studies are presented to provide an understanding on which 
determinants may affect divestiture transactions in South Africa. 
 
2.2.1 Corporate Focus Theories 
Improvements to management’s ability in focussing on the firm’s core segments have been 
identified as one of the most important motivating factors behind corporate divestitures (John 
& Ofek, 1995). Large firms with complicated corporate structures often result in managers 
having less attention devoted to the firm’s core business activities (John & Ofek, 1995). After 
certain levels of firm diversification related to previous M&A activity, a reduction in the 
firm’s performance can occur due to stresses related to monitoring efforts required from the 
firm’s managers (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). An inability to keep abreast of all the firm’s 
operations as a result of opaque corporate structures can lead to manager’s attention 
becoming stretched to its limits. A lack of focus can then lead to losses for the firm. 
However, the corporate focus hypothesis argues that firms which increase corporate focus 
can benefit from managers having more time which can be allocated to the firm’s core 
segments in a more efficient manner (John & Ofek, 1995). Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) 
and Berger and Ofek (1999) further support John and Ofek (1995), arguing that enhanced 
corporate focus may be a key objective in corporate restructuring programmes. Furthermore, 
Lehtonen (2008) also supports this view by arguing that a key benefit of refocusing 
programmes relates to managers having more oversight on the firm’s revenue-generating 
business units. 
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Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Linn and Rozeff (1984) argue that divestitures may be 
related to previous acquisition activity. During the 1960s and 1970s firms grew in size and 
complexity as a result of previous M&A activity. M&A activity was motivated by empire-
building practices which led to firms with complex corporate structures (Ferreira, 1997). 
Some of these transactions resulted in firms acquiring segments which did not fit with the 
firm’s overall strategic goals (Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). Following the 1960s and 1970s 
divestitures grew in popularity as firms looked to benefit from enhanced monitoring 
associated with running leaner operational structures. Divestiture activity grew as firms 
looked to benefit from a reduction of the firm’s overall scope in order to enhance the 
manager’s attention on core segments of the firm. As a result unbundling of large 
conglomerates became standard practice during the 1980s (John & Ofek, 1995). Ferreira 
(1997) argues that in order to improve firm value, South African firms followed global trends 
of simplifying their organisational structures with the aim of enhancing corporate focus 
(Bhana, 2006). Larger firms may suffer from incorrect valuations due to a lack of 
transparency associated with complicated corporate structures. However, enhancing focus 
through the pursuit of leaner structures was in stark contrast to previous practices of over-
diversification and empire building employed during the 1960s and 1970s (Ferreira, 1997). 
 
Divestitures implemented with the objective of increasing focus and improving the firm’s 
performance may result in a convergence of shareholder, manager and external analyst 
incentives. Shareholders and managers can benefit from enhancements to the firm’s value as 
a result of improvements in the monitoring of the firm’s operations. Therefore, time gained 
can lead to improved share prices as a result of a reduction in monitoring costs. Benefits 
associated with leaner firms also include enhancements in operational synergies (Mulherin & 
Boone, 2000). Afshar et al. (1992) state that in environments where negative synergies may 
exist, disposing of loss-making units which do not possess a strategic fit with the overall firm 
can contribute to the diminution of the selling firm’s shareholders (Nichols et al., 2014). 
Byerly, Lamont and Keasler (2003) also argue that divestitures implemented with the 
intention of increasing corporate focus can influence market reactions in a positive manner. 
Divesting a subsidiary may be beneficial in the valuation of the overall firm as it creates more 
transparency for shareholders, managers and external analysts (Lehtonen, 2008).  
 
Additionally, incentive schemes for the firm’s managers are often linked to the profits that a 
firm generates. Enhancements in the firm’s performance can result in higher share prices and 
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managers benefits from enhancements in their personal (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1989). Therefore, positive market reactions associated with divestitures can also be 
beneficial for the firm’s managers. Divestitures simplify firm structures; therefore, an added 
benefit of leaner corporate structures also includes reduced managerial entrenchment. 
Managers of leaner firms can benefit from a reduction in employment risk as a result of 
improvements to the firm’s profits associated with running leaner firms. This can result in an 
alignment of interests between managers, shareholders and external analysts. This 
phenomenon is described by the incentive alignment hypothesis. An example of an alignment 
of incentives relates to managers who become shareholders of a new firm that is established 
as a result of a spin-off. A spin-off where managers have an equity interest in the newly-
established legal entity can benefit from compensation in the form of ownership interests. 
The compensation received in the form of equity holdings would result in managers having a 
vested interest in the performance of the newly-established entity. 
 
Research has provided evidence showing the benefits of refocusing programmes on 
shareholder wealth enhancement (John & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Berger & 
Ofek, 1999; Desai & Jain, 1999; Bhana, 2006). John and Ofek (1995) found that 34% of 
firms in their sample which reduced business segments from one year to the next with the use 
of a divestiture, increased firm value. Desai and Jain (1999) found 3-day abnormal returns to 
be significantly larger for focus increasing spin-offs (4.45%) versus non-focus increasing 
spin-offs. Studies also provide evidence that firms which engage in divestitures to increase 
corporate focus generally achieve enhanced operating performance (Comment & Jarrell, 
1995; John & Ofek, 1995). An enhancement in operating performance resulted in improved 
stock returns for these entities. Bhana (2006) also found that corporate focus is a statistically 
significant determinant of divestitures in South Africa (significant at the 0.05 level). This 
study found that firms enhanced performance levels as a result of their ability to focus on 
fewer business segments. Finally, Hillier et al. (2009) also conducted a study investigating 
the effects of divestitures on firms in the UK. This study found that firms which stated 
refocusing as a determinant of divestiture transactions reported CARs of 0.646 and 0.920 
using a 2-day (-1;0) and 3-day (-1;+1) event window, respectively. Results of both event 
windows proved to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Studies have used different variables to measure corporate focus. However, the proxies for 
corporate focus used in this study are in line with Berger and Ofek (1999). To measure 
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corporate focus this study used sales growth and CEO Turnover. Sales growth measures the 
firm’s ability to increase revenue over a certain period of time. Sales figures can be a source 
for influencing the formulation and execution of corporate strategies which managers and 
shareholders of the firm would use to enhance firm value (Gerald & Elisifa, 2013). 
Additionally, sales figures over time are the most widely utilised measure of growth for a 
firm and are a key metric in the overall decision-making process (Gerald & Elisifa, 2013). 
Shareholders and the other market participants may use poor revenue figures as a form of 
corporate discipline by requesting that the firm should refocus its strategy to improve sales 
growth. Therefore, when sales decline, managers of the firm can be pressured to re-establish 
company growth. Berger and Ofek (1999) found that sales growth has a statistically 
significant effect on the divestiture decision. Findings suggest that firms would focus their 
attention on revenue-generating segments of the business firm (Berger & Ofek, 1999).  
 
During extended periods of underperformance by the firm, dissatisfied shareholders can 
institute pressure on the firm’s management team to implement a refocusing strategy. If 
underperformance persists, shareholders can replace the firm’s CEO as a form of corporate 
control (Berger & Ofek, 1999). Stakeholders would base their decision on the likelihood of 
the incumbent CEO not divesting previously acquired non-performing units. Incumbent 
CEOs would oppose the divestiture decision as a form of admitting that they made mistakes 
in the past. These views are supported by Weisbach (1995). Berger and Ofek (1999) found 
that approximately 31% of firms in their sample instituted changes to the CEO as a form of 
corporate refocusing. However, the replacement of the CEO by sample firms was not 
significantly higher than firms which did not institute refocusing programmes. These findings 
support Berger and Ofek (1999) who show that CEO Turnover possesses a statistically 
significant impact on divestitures. Authors argue that to avoid past mistakes, non-performing 
managers would not divest (Berger & Ofek, 1999). These arguments are in line with Scherer 
(1988) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), and support Boot (1992)’s views. 
 
2.2.2 Efficiency Theories 
Divestitures can be used as a process which improves corporate efficiency. An enhancement 
in corporate efficiency can result in an enhancement of the firm’s overall value (Berger & 
Ofek, 1999). Simpler corporate structures can lead to enhancements in synergies related to 
how the firm operates. In turn, these can result in a reduction of the firm’s running costs 
(Ferreira, 1997). Efficiency theories argue that a firm may be worth more when separately 
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owned or managed as opposed to the firm being incorporated in large business structures that 
are difficult to understand (Schipper & Smith, 1983; Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983). Efficiency 
theories argue that when a large firm is separated into smaller businesses, shareholders 
benefit from reduced monitoring associated with running a smaller entity. Additionally, 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) argue that improvements in synergies can result in positive 
announcement returns. These views are supported by Daley et al. (1997) who illustrate the 
benefits that divestitures have in enhancing corporate efficiency. Therefore, firms may use 
divestitures to enhance operational efficiency, reduce running costs and improve their 
revenue-generating streams (Dittmar & Shivdasani, 2003; Berger & Ofek, 1999).  
 
Rather than simply evaluating each unit, capital markets also consider the performance of all 
the different business units within the firm when valuing the overall firm. Synergy 
explanations related to divestitures argue that in cases where synergies are too perfect, firms 
may be too small in size (Buckley, 1991). Positive synergies suggest that prior acquisitions 
increase overall firm value by the amount which exceeds the cost of the previously acquired 
asset (Buckley, 1991). However, benefits associated with expanding a small firm into a larger 
organisation may be a disadvantage for the firm’s managers (Williamson, 1985). In contrast, 
negative synergies suggest that a firm may be too large in size. Additional monitoring efforts 
required by firms with complicated corporate structures can lead to diseconomies of scale. 
Therefore, negative synergies may suggest that a “lack of fit” exists between the divested unit 
and other divisions within the firm which can have a negative effect on firm value. The 
negative impact on firm value would result in managers having to stretch their efforts in 
monitoring large firms to their maximum (Buckley, 1991). Additionally, if negative synergies 
are related to previous M&A activity, divestitures can provide evidence that the firm was 
previously run in an inefficient manner by managers (Buckley, 1991). Therefore, negative 
synergies within the firm can suggest that a separately owned unit may be worth more to 
shareholders than if the unit was incorporated into a large parent (Buckley, 1991). Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992) support this view by arguing that divestitures can enhance shareholder 
wealth if the aim is to improve synergies. These views are also supported by Bradley, Desai 
and Kim (1983). However, efficiency theory arguments are incomplete without 
understanding why the firm’s management may prefer large firms with complex corporate 
structures (Buckley, 1991). 
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Baker, Jensen & Murphy, (1988) provide an explanation of management’s preference for 
excessive firm size. First, the unique experience required in running operations of larger 
firms provides management with an advantage of understanding the inner workings of 
complex firms (Buckley, 1991). The knowledge that current management teams have in 
running complex businesses contrast with risks associated with employing and training new 
managers, primarily from an added cost perspective. Therefore, hiring new management 
teams could prove to be costly for the firm’s shareholders and current management teams 
would enjoy greater job security. Second, remuneration packages are often tied to the size of 
the firm. Therefore, larger corporate structures could incentivise the building of empires by 
the firm’s managers. If remuneration packages are tied to earnings and the value of a large-
parent firm, managers would oppose reducing the firm’s size (Schipper & Smith, 1986). 
Opposition to a divestiture would be motivated by an expectation that incentives would be 
reduced as a product of running smaller firms and excessive firm size can result in manager 
self-entrenchment (Baker et al., 1988). 
 
However, Coase (1988) argues that simpler corporate structures benefit both shareholders and 
other claimholders including the firm’s managers. Shareholders would enjoy greater 
oversight of the firm’s operations as a result of corporate structures that are easier to 
understand. In order to enjoy the benefits of enhanced oversight, shareholders would impose 
restructuring programmes which may include a divestiture in order to benefit from reduced 
monitoring associated with simpler corporate structures (Buckley, 1991). Additionally, 
management teams can also benefit from correcting synergies of the firm through the use of a 
divestiture. The correction of negative synergies would result in the firm running more 
efficiently would lead to an improvement in firm value. Managers would benefit from greater 
job security and an improvement in their remuneration packages as a result of a divestiture. 
However, proceeds received from divestitures should be reinvested to enhance the firm’s 
operating efficiency and these arguments provide additional motivation for increasing 
transparency through the use of divestitures.  
  
Studies argue that a motivating factor behind divestiture decisions relates to a “lack of fit" 
between the divested asset and the rest of the firm’s operations (Hite & Owers, 1983; 
Schipper & Smith, 1983; Alexander, et. al., 1984; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). Hite and 
Owers (1983) reported 5-day gains of 9.3% for firms which announced that a spin-off from 
the parent firm would be incorporated into another firm, versus gains of 4.7% in their overall 
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sample. Hite and Owers (1983) also reported excess returns of 14.5% between day -50 and 
the completion of a spin-off. In a sample of 30 spin-offs, correcting negative synergies was 
related to 65 acquisitions in the 2 years preceding a divestiture (Schipper & Smith, 1986). 17 
of the 30 spin-offs in this study were explicitly reversals of previous acquisitions. Schipper 
and Smith (1986) found that 37 of the 58 spin-offs in their study reported that negative 
synergies were a determinant of the divestiture decision. Linn and Rozeff (1985) found that 
the largest abnormal returns in spin-offs were motivated by a need to correct negative 
synergies present in parent firms. Additionally, when parent firms issue stock in a new 
subsidiary through a spin-off, 5-day positive returns around the announcement date reported 
gains of 1.8% (Buckley, 1991). Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) also provide evidence related to 
negative synergy explanations that are associated with gains from divestitures and their 
findings are consistent with observations from Bradley et al. (1983). 
 
Prior literature has used ROA, ROE or ROS to measure firm efficiency. An over-investment 
in non-performing business units by the firm can negatively affect firm value. Increasing 
ROA levels can provide evidence of an improvement in the firm’s ability to generate returns 
from the assets that it owns. Therefore, an increase in ROAs as a result of a divestiture can 
provide evidence that the firm has corrected the inefficient use of capital (Maksimovic & 
Phillips, 2001; Warusawitharana, 2008). Increasing ROE figures can illustrate that the firm 
has improved its ability to generate returns from capital invested by equity holders. 
Therefore, shareholders would be interested in this financial metric as an indicator of the 
overall firm’s performance. Increasing ROS figures illustrate an enhancement in the firm’s 
ability to generate returns from its turnover. However, for the purposes of the study, ROA 
and ROE were utilised to measure firm efficiency. Hillier et al. (2009) found that share price 
reactions in the UK are positively correlated to improvements in operating returns after the 
divestiture announcement. Their study reported that investors react positively to divestiture 
announcements as a result of the benefits associated with improvements in firm efficiency. 
Additionally, their sample portfolio of divesting firms found that improvements in corporate 
efficiency resulted in enhancements to ROA (-0.001 to 0.038) in the 3 years before and 3 
years after the divestiture announcement (Hillier et al., 2009). Furthermore, firms which 
stated that poor performance led to the divestiture reported CARs of 0.641 and 0.929 for 2-
day (-1;0) and 3-day (-1;+1) event windows, respectively. Results for both event windows 
were statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
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2.2.3 Financing Theories 
Divestitures can provide an alternative avenue that firms can utilise in raising capital. 
Divestitures allow the firm to raise capital internally rather than raising capital externally in 
debt or equity markets. However, by including non-performing segments on the firm’s 
balance sheet over a sustained period of time can contribute to managers experiencing 
difficulty in replicating financial market returns which creditors may require in order to 
extend financing to a firm. Therefore, internal financing through the use of divestitures can be 
a source for liberating potential cash flows from within the firm (Nichols et al., 2014). Cash 
flows generated from divested assets can provide incremental value creation for the firm’s 
shareholders as opposed to the actual change in the divested asset’s value (Owen, et. al., 
2010). Proceeds unlocked through internal capital expropriation can allow firms to redirect 
divestiture proceeds towards business units or external investment projects that possess 
marginally higher returns than the divested asset’s returns (Owen et al., 2010). However, a 
key requirement of raising capital internally by using divestitures states that divestiture 
proceeds should be reinvested in an efficient manner. 
 
The efficient deployment of asset sales hypothesis argues that managers of the firm only 
retain assets that they believe possess a comparative advantage (Lang, Poulsen & Stulz, 
1995). Lang et al. (2014) argue that a transfer of ownership rights should occur with a 
counterparty that can manage these assets more efficiently irrespective of their financial 
situation (Nichols et al., 2014). Continuing to have underperforming assets on the firm’s 
balance sheet can result in the firm’s capital structure not being at its optimum level 
(Buckley, 1991). Furthermore, underperforming assets can create a “drag” on the firm’s 
profits which may disrupt its ability to raise capital externally as a result of the negative 
impact they may have on the firm’s cost of capital (Buckley, 1991). Therefore, firms should 
sell assets which negatively firm value and the firm’s ability to raise capital externally. 
Alternatively, firms can sell assets which no longer fulfil their strategic objectives as soon as 
the opportunity presents itself. Capital raised from these assets would then be reinvested 
within the firm or in projects that enhance overall firm value. If firms ignore the possibility of 
redeploying proceeds received from selling these underperforming business units, firms may 
lose out on the opportunity to invest in projects that can enhance firm value (Hite & Owers, 
1983). Firms may also lose out on benefits associated with reducing their overall debt if 
underperforming assets remain on the balance sheet (Buckley, 1991).  
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Nguyen (2013) also argues that divestiture proceeds should be reallocated to projects which 
increase the firm’s revenues which can lead to an enhancement in the overall value of a firm. 
These views are supported by arguments from Chen and Guo (2005) who argue that proceeds 
from divestitures should be used to reduce any financial constraints that the firm may have. 
Selling firms should select assets which posses the largest opportunity cost relative to the 
value of cash flows they may generate from a divestiture (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001). 
Shareholders of the selling firm would benefit equally from the redeployment of proceeds 
received whether they are reinvested in the firm or are paid out to investors. However, 
divestiture transactions implemented in restructuring programmes which look to split up the 
firm may result in an increase in the firm’s overall risk. Creditors would oppose the 
divestiture decision if this risk is shifted between claimholders with no benefit to creditors. 
Therefore, if de-conglomerisation is implemented solely to increase firm value; creditors may 
be negatively impacted if shareholder gains exceed creditor losses (Buckley, 1991). 
Therefore, proceeds from divestitures should be utilised in a manner in line with both the 
financing hypothesis and the efficient deployment of asset sales hypothesis. 
 
Lang et al. (1995)’s findings support the financing hypothesis. Their study found that firms 
which used divestiture proceeds to pay shareholders reported ARs of 3.92%. In contrast, 
firms which used proceeds to repay debt obligations reported ARs of -0.48%. However, their 
findings proved to be in opposition to the efficient deployment hypothesis. Hillier et al. 
(2009) also conducted a study to determine whether divestiture proceeds were reinvested to 
enhancement firm value. Their study found that AARs on the announcement day reported 
positive returns of 0.895 (significant at the 0.01 level). Authors also reported CARs of 0.327 
and 0.584 using a 2-day (-1;0) and 3-day (-1;+1) event windows, respectively. However, 
these findings also proved not to be significant. Additionally, firms which stated financing 
working capital as a determinant of the divestiture decision reported CARs of -0.500 and -
0.398 for 2-day (-1;0) and 3-day (-1;+1) event windows, respectively (Hillier et al., 2009). 
However, these findings proved not to be statistically significant. Hiller et al. (2009) also 
studied whether reductions in debt proved to be a statistically significant determinant of 
divestitures. Firms which stated debt reduction as a determinant of divestiture decisions 
reported ARs of 0.733 and 1.060 using a 2-day (-1;0) and 3-day (-1;+1) event window, 
respectively. Both sets of results proved to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Results 
reported in Hillier et al. (2009) provide evidence that divestitures can be motivated by 
decisions that satisfy arguments related to financing theories. Therefore, divestitures still 
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possess wealth enhancing benefits for shareholders of the firm if their proceeds are utilised in 
the correct manner.  
 
2.2.4 Expropriation Theories 
The financing hypothesis provides an understanding of the ability that divestitures have as a 
process which firms can use to raise capital. However, managers often have to meet certain 
performance objectives and during periods of sustained underperformance firms may have 
very stringent requirements attached to their resources. If firms continue to underperform as a 
result of including non-performing segments on the balance sheet, managers will experience 
additional scrutiny by the firm’s shareholders (Buckley, 1991). Furthermore, if 
underperformance persists, managers may experience difficulty in raising capital externally 
and will be unable to invest in value-generating projects. This is a result of markets being 
more cautious when extending financing to an underperforming firm. However, firms may 
need to divest from profitable businesses in order to enhance firm value in situations where 
alternative financing avenues present themselves (Mayers and Smith, 1986). Therefore, 
should external financing prove to be too costly for firms, companies can use divestitures as a 
source for raising capital (Buckley, 1991).  
 
According to expropriation theories, divestitures can be an inexpensive form of raising 
capital. Inexpensive financing theories argue that the primary aim of firms engaging in sell-
offs is that firms should raise capital from sale of a business unit or asset if they cannot raise 
capital externally (Buckley, 1991). During environments where external financing is deemed 
to be too costly, firms use internal financing processes which are available to them. If firms 
do not use these processes they may forfeit the opportunity to invest in positive NPV projects 
(Buckley, 1991). However, Modigliani-Miller (M&M) financing irrelevance propositions 
argue that this would not be optimal when assuming costless access to capital markets (Miller 
& Modigliani, 1961). Therefore, sell-offs would not be an option if M&M theory 
assumptions hold, and companies would not take on all positive NPV projects. Buckley 
(1991) argues that divestitures may prove to be beneficial to a firm during periods where debt 
markets prove to be too costly, particularly in the future (Buckley, 1991). Therefore, 
divestitures may provide a better option for managers of the firm to raise capital internally 
rather than externally and divestiture proceeds can then be reinvested to finance higher 
return-generating projects (Dahlum & Tai, 2015).  
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However, Mayers and Smith (1986) provide an important consideration related to potential 
risks of expropriating capital through the use of divestitures. Mayers and Smith (1986) argue 
that managers can be motivated by windfalls which affect their remuneration schemes as 
opposed to the need to enhance overall firm value. Windfalls would exhibit themselves in the 
form of share compensation structures or cash incentives attached to a large increase in the 
firm’s profits as a result of recognising divestiture proceeds on the firm’s financial statements 
(Buckley, 1991). Therefore, managers would look to benefit from compensation windfalls by 
arguing that the divestiture would enhance firm, when in fact managers were motivated by a 
desire to benefit from a need to enhance short-term profits which may tied to their 
remuneration packages.  
 
Contrastingly, Hansmann (1996) provides a more balanced view. Hansmann (1996) argues 
that the form of organisational realignment is motivated by minimisation of transaction costs. 
Hansmann (1996) argues that the mutual form will prevail when contracting costs are larger 
than risk-bearing costs. For example; if divestitures transfer wealth from debt to equity 
holders, shareholders would be required to compensate for the right to extract wealth from a 
higher cost of credit. However, this redistribution of expropriated wealth would be neutral 
from an ex-ante perspective (Galai & Masulis, 1976; Jensen & Meckling; 1976; Myers, 1977; 
Buckley, 1991). Therefore, shareholders may only benefit from purposeful expropriation 
tactics during periods when the transfer of wealth is larger than the present value of losses 
(Buckley, 1991). Another viewpoint related to capital expropriation relates to creditor 
expropriation theories.  
 
Creditor expropriation theories centre on the protection of creditors and their claims against 
any proceeds. These theories suggest that divestiture gains can be attributed to an 
unanticipated transfer of value from the firm’s creditors to its shareholders (Buckley, 1991). 
Expropriation of wealth may be the result of an increase in the firm’s risk levels through an 
enhanced distribution of wealth to shareholders of the firm (Buckley, 1991). Creditors may 
not desire for an expropriation of proceeds received from divestitures. Therefore, in search of 
a consensus bargain, creditors would look for barriers to excessive distributions. Creditors 
can protect their claims through negotiations which reinforce anti-divestiture barriers. They 
may do so by exercising veto powers related to any expropriation of capital from within the 
firm. Creditors would use measures which were previously agreed during negotiations when 
creditors extended loans to the firm (Galai & Masulis, 1976; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
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Myers, 1977). However, creditor expropriation theories may not fully take into account 
benefits associated with divestiture gains as they would reduce firm value if other 
claimholders were to bear these costs (Hite & Owers, 1983; Schipper & Smith, 1986; 
Buckley, 1991). Therefore, excessive distribution theories can offer an alternative to creditor 
expropriation theories.  
 
Excessive distribution theories offer an account of any barriers associated with divestitures. 
These theories exhibit themselves in environments where restrictions are imposed on any 
gains received from selling an asset or business unit (Buckley, 1991). Excessive distribution 
theories primarily relate to a disproportionate payout of divestiture gains. Proceeds from 
divestitures would be paid out disproportionately if divestiture gains were to be paid to 
shareholders first rather than creditors (Buckley, 1991). This would result in creditor claims 
becoming worthless. Therefore, to protect themselves against this risk, creditors may 
negotiate veto powers as a form of bargaining power during the loan process in order to 
protect their interests should management execute divestitures in the future. Creditors would 
protect their interests by including certain conditions in any pre-arranged loan agreements by 
attaching covenants on any divestiture gains (Schipper & Smith, 1986). Should any assets be 
sold, these covenants in loan agreements would give creditors the ability to claim ownership 
rights on any assets disposed of irrespective of where these assets may be incorporated 
following a divestiture (Hite & Owers, 1983). For example; creditors may attach their claims 
against the divested unit’s new legal entity or domicile should there be a spin-off (Buckley, 
1991). Therefore, these requirements can be used to protect creditors against any potential 
payouts which are disproportionate (Buckley, 1991). However, spin-offs are generally not a 
capital raising technique and are viewed more as a form of unlocking value from the assets 
which are spun-off.  
 
Finally, other stakeholders such as employees or governments may also have a desire to 
claim proceeds received from divestitures. Buckley (1991) argues that these claimholders 
may not be opposed to the expropriation of wealth from a redistribution viewpoint. However, 
these claimholders would be opposed to capital from an efficiency standpoint. These views 
are consistent with arguments highlighted in other studies (Galai & Masulis, 1976; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). However, claims on divestiture proceeds by these 
stakeholders are not a common occurrence. Studies have explored the ability that divestitures 
have as a process for expropriating capital from within the firm. However, inexpensive 
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financing theories may not provide the best explanations for this phenomenon, but an 
understanding of the relationship which exists between expropriation theories and financing 
theories provides a more comprehensive view of the ability that divestitures have in raising 
capital for firms. 
 
Skantz and Marchesini (1987) found that divestitures intended to expropriate capital reported 
ARs of 21.4% in the month of the announcement. However, only 57.87% of firms in their 
sample reported the intended use of divestiture proceeds. Hite and Owers (1983) found that in 
29 of the 53 pairs in their sample which had expropriation as the intended purpose of 
divestitures, share prices and senior security ARs reported the same signs. Additionally, 
Hillier et al. (2009) found that 6.05% of firms in their sample stated that divestiture proceeds 
were intended to finance working capital. Authors reported that ARs increase when selling 
firms use divestiture proceeds to service debt or use those proceeds to finance working 
capital. 34.38% of firms in their sample stated that divestiture proceeds would be used to 
reduce debt and 14.77% of firms stated that divestiture proceeds would be reinvested in the 
firm (Hillier et al., 2009). As expropriation theories tend to work in conjunction with 
financing theories, results from Hillier et al. (2009) detailing how capital expropriated from 
within the firm has affected firm have been discussed in section 2.2.3.  
 
2.2.5 Information Theories 
Managers and shareholders may believe that markets do not understand the firm’s overall 
corporate structure. This lack of understanding can be associated with a lack of transparency 
in the firm’s operating structure that is associated with large firms that have complicated 
business structures. This lack of transparency may result in a discount to the valuation of the 
overall firm (Weston, Chung & Siu, 1998; Nichols et al., 2014). Therefore, managers and 
shareholders who believe that their firm is undervalued by capital markets can use 
divestitures as a form of increasing an understanding of the firm’s organisational structure 
(Weston et al., 1998). Managers and shareholders may be motivated to exit business units 
with the intention of reducing such information asymmetries. 
 
The information asymmetry hypothesis argues that investors suffer from a lack of knowledge 
in the firm’s operations due to lower transparency that is associated with complex 
organisational structures (Vijh, 2002; Lehtonen, 2008). An enhanced understanding of the 
firm’s organisational structure may result in a reduction of valuation errors by external 
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analysts (Zuckerman, 2000). According to the information hypothesis, firms simplify 
corporate structures to manage risks associated with this lack of information which external 
analysts may suffer from (Chen & Guo, 2005; Nichols et al., 2014). Therefore, a sale of a 
portion of the firm’s business or a separation of the firm’s segments into independent 
businesses can minimise risks associated with incorrect valuations of the firm (Chen & Guo, 
2005). 
 
Additionally, the information transparency hypothesis argues that external analysts often 
view divestitures in a positive light due to their ability of increasing transparency and 
simplifying corporate structures that are difficult to understand. Therefore, the share price of 
the selling firm may improve subsequent to new information being available to market 
participants (Buckley, 1991). The information hypothesis is particularly important in 
spinoffs. Spin-offs have the ability to provide greater information to market participants 
(Nichols et al., 2014). Share issuances in spin-offs can signal that market participants have 
incorrectly valued the firm as a whole due to asymmetries in information (Schipper & Smith, 
1986). Benefits of spin-offs include increased transparency in the newly formed firm and 
investors often view spin-offs as pure plays (Lehtonen, 2008). Higher share prices would be a 
result of the spin-off extracting a mismatch in value. Furthermore, from a signalling theory 
standpoint, sell-offs may be a cheaper form of financing rather than other capital-raising 
methods (Buckley, 1991). However, Klein (1983) found that returns from sell-offs are not 
significant unless the selling price is disclosed. 
 
Schipper and Smith (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) provide evidence of 
inconsistencies present in signalling theories and their effects on divestiture gains. Simpler 
corporate structures can result in a firm of higher quality as a result of the lowering of 
information asymmetries (Williamson, 1979). However, divestitures may impose additional 
costs to managers of the firm and this cost is differentially borne by managers in both higher 
and lower quality firms (Buckley, 1991). Williamson (1979) suggests that cost differentials 
provide constraints that discourage lower quality firms from false signals. If transaction costs 
are greater than the value of the firm, the divestiture may signal that the firm is of better 
quality than previously thought (Buckley, 1991). However, if the divestiture results in an 
increase in the overall risk of the firm, the sale may threaten other aspects of the firm 
(Buckley, 1991). This phenomenon is due to managers of higher-quality firms understanding 
that default is highly unlikely, but merely a representation of an increase in the firm’s risk. 
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Divestitures can also reduce information asymmetries through enhancements to corporate 
focus (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). Difficulties experienced between shareholders, 
managers, and other market participants can result in lower valuations of the firm. Therefore, 
if asymmetries in information exist between the firm’s manager, shareholders and other 
market participants, share issuances would be viewed as a signal that the firm is incorrectly 
valued (Schipper & Smith, 1986). Signalling theories may provide a better explanation of 
costs associated with external financing as investors are heterogeneous in nature. Investors 
have different preferences related to information conveyed by the firm and divestitures can 
provide vital information which may not have been apparent during the valuation process. 
Signalling theories argue that divestitures can indicate the existence of value that is hidden 
within the firm. Additionally, signalling theories primarily provide an understanding during 
periods where external investors have less access to information about the firm than their 
internal counterparts (that is firm insiders). According to signalling theories, external market 
participants value the firm as a whole (Buckley, 1991). Therefore, if the divestiture 
announcement signals hidden value, gains from a divestiture should continue to persist for 
shareholders even in cases where divestitures are not executed. However, the effects of 
divestiture announcements may be reversed when the divestiture is later terminated 
(Copeland, Lemgruber & Mayers, 1987). Therefore, the value of the divested segments 
previously held by a large parent can provide even more important information to market 
participants. 
 
Chen and Guo (2005) found that means and (medians) of the information asymmetry variable 
in their sample reported results of 2.00 (1.00) for the full sample, 2.25 (1.00) for spin-offs and 
1.99 (1.00) for sell-offs. Moreover, Chen and Guo (2005) found that when results reported in 
their study were adjusted, the average information asymmetry variable was significantly 
larger for sample firms than control firms. Additionally, multinomial logit analyses 
measuring the marginal effects of information asymmetry reported returns of 0.003 and 0.009 
for spin-offs and sell-offs, respectively. However, these results proved not to be statistically 
significant. The information asymmetry variable did, however, prove to be significant at the 
0.10 level for equity carve-outs which reported marginal effects of -0.013. Furthermore, 
model 1 of ordered logit regressions in Chen and Guo (2005) found that the information 
asymmetry variable which authors used in their study possessed statistical significance as a 
determinant of divestitures.  
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2.2.6 Governance Theories 
Divestiture decisions can be motivated by external regulatory pressures. Legislation may be 
enacted by governmental, regulatory organisations or both agencies which draft such laws in 
order to enforce an environment that requires good governance by firms operating in their 
country (Collier & Roberts, 2013). Changes in governance requirements are particularly 
important in environments where new regulatory measures or restrictions affect the firm as a 
whole (Buckley, 1991). However, regulations may also affect a specific business unit or asset 
within the parent firm. If new legislation is adopted these regulations can sometimes result in 
the establishment of a stand-alone entity. Alternatively, they can provide additional 
motivation to comply with legislation resulting in the parent selling a segment within the 
business (Owen et. al., 2010). These measures are particularly important in over-diversified 
firms that have complex businesses structures. However, if firms ignore new regulations, they 
may be subjected to disciplinary actions which may result in reputational and/or financial 
risks. Bhana (2006) supports the view that new regulations may provide additional impetus to 
the divestiture decision. Therefore, governance theories relate to this phenomenon that results 
in firms employing divestitures as a form of complying with regulations that are imposed by 
external agencies. 
 
Firms would cite their need to abide by requirements associated with “Codes of good 
practice” as a motivating factor behind the divestiture decision. However, some managers 
may oppose the divestiture decision. Managers may oppose a divestiture due to risks 
associated with a reduction to their personal wealth. Risks are related to lower remuneration 
packages and less managerial expertise associated with running smaller and undiversified 
firms that have fewer segments (Owen et. al., 2010). Managers may also oppose the 
divestiture decision in order to benefit from greater job security that is associated with the 
unique experience required in managing large firms which can provide them with greater job 
security. Additionally, managers would oppose divestitures due to any discomfort associated 
with an evolving firm (Buckley, 1991). Therefore, new regulation can provide an avenue for 
the parent firm’s shareholders to exit from business units that no longer fit with the firm’s 
strategic objectives. Shareholders would argue that a reconfiguration of the firm’s 
organisational structure through the use of divestitures was motivated by a need to comply 
with changing regulatory requirements (Owen et. al., 2010). However, firms may also be 
opposed to divestitures due to risks associated with losing any competitive advantage borne 
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from benefits associated with economies of scale (Owen et. al., 2010). Therefore, regulations 
may be required to stimulate the breaking up conglomerates in order to increase competition 
in an economy. 
 
Regulations have impacted markets dominated by large conglomerates. Regulators looking to 
foster a competitive business environment have instituted changes in legislation with the aim 
of reducing the existence of large conglomerates. For example in the US, the Banking Act of 
1933 led to the separation of commercial banking activities from investment banking 
activities (Carpenter, E. Murphy & M. Murphy, 2016). JP Morgan & Co. was split into JP 
Morgan (the Commercial Bank) and Morgan Stanley (the securities firm). In South Africa, 
legislation such as the BBBEE Act of 2003, the King II Report and the Policy Document on 
Company Law Reform are pieces of legislation which have affected corporations. The King 
II report recommended that directors should consider the interests of other stakeholders in the 
daily management of their firm (Rossouw, 2002). This piece of legislation also included 
measures related to the long-term sustainability of the firm. According to legislation, if 
portions of the business were in opposition to the long-term health of the firm, managers and 
shareholders were required to exit these subsidiaries or business units. Code 101 in the 
“Codes of Good Practice on BBBEE” by the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry was another piece of legislation which affected divestiture activity in South Africa 
(Bhana, 2006). Legislation suggested that firms looking to obtain BBBEE status may do so 
through a sale of assets and businesses to individuals or organisations which met BBBEE 
requirements. This new directive differed from the equity ownership mandate related to 
previously disadvantaged individuals and may have influenced divestiture activity in South 
Africa (Bhana, 2006). 
 
However, regulatory restrictions cannot be considered the singular reason for undergoing 
divestiture decisions, as shareholders would anticipate larger gains for divestitures. Haynes et 
al. (2002) found that resistance by managers of the firm to a divestiture may not be 
independent of external corporate governance requirements. Owen et al. (2010) reported that 
firms which possess a robust corporate governance culture have a greater probability of using 
divestitures in corporate restructuring programmes. Their study found that divestitures 
executed with the intention of abiding by corporate governance requirements had positive 
reactions by market participants. Additionally, Owen et al. (2010) found that firms which 
operate in highly competitive markets are more likely to divest. Their study also argued that 
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good internal and external corporate governance results in the best benefits for shareholders 
of a firm. Owen et al. (2010) reported that variables related to corporate governance such as; 
the number of independent board members and the number of block holders (shareholders 
with considerable amounts of equity in the firm) possessed statistical significance as 
determinants of divestitures. Furthermore, variables related to corporate governance which 
increased the likelihood of firms engaging in divestitures included; stronger shareholder 
rights, significant equity ownership by management and the presence of large boards (Owen 
et al., 2010). 
 
Buchholtz, Lubatkin and O’Neill (1999) also provide evidence on the significance of 
corporate governance in complex corporate decisions. Authors report that additional 
corporate governance mechanisms may be imperative in firms considering divestitures. 
Buchholtz et al. (1999) also argue that governance requirements provide evidence of the 
heterogeneity in divestiture decisions. Schipper and Smith (1986) reported that 18 of the 58 
spin-offs in their sample were motivated by regulatory or tax concerns. Additionally, Hite 
and Owers (1983) identified regulatory concerns as the primary reason for the divestment 
decision in their study, with 19 out of 123 spin-offs being motivated by governance 
requirements. Their study reported 2-day returns from spin-offs motivated by regulatory or 
legal issues which were consistent with Schipper and Smith (1986). 
 
2.3 Divestitures and Firm Value – findings of prior studies 
Studies investigating the impact of divestitures on firm value have reported mixed results. 
However, more studies have reported positive divestiture returns (Alexander et al, 1984; Jain, 
1985; Allen, Lummer, McConnell & Reed, 1995; Daley et al., 1997; Lehtonen, 2008; Hillier 
et al., 2009; Owen et al., 2010; Nguyen, 2013; Dahlum & Tai, 2015). A few studies have 
reported negative returns over the short-term (Murray, 2000; Joosub et al, 2017). 
Additionally, other studies have reported negative returns over the long-term (Sudarsanam & 
Qian, 2007; Lee & Lin, 2008; Zakaria & Arnold, 2010; Nichols et al., 2014) and Fogh (2009) 
reported mixed results. Studies investigating the impact of divestitures over a short-term 
event window around the announcement date have reported positive excess returns 
(Alexander et al., 1984; Jain, 1985; Hite et al., 1987; Berger & Ofek, 1996; Rajan, Servaes & 
Zingales, 2000; Lehtonen, 2008; Hillier et al., 2009). 
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Hite et al. (1987) initially focused on the effects of sell-offs on shareholder wealth, finding 
that that gains from sell-offs are lower than spinoffs. Their study found that sell-offs reported 
gains of 1.7%. Hite et al. (1987) also found that sell-offs in a 100-day window reported an 
increase of 8.0% in the share price. Additionally, Jain (1985) reported gains of 0.7% from 
sell-offs using a 5-day event window. Studies initially focussing on voluntary spin-off 
announcements show significant share price increases over a 2-day event window. Both Hite 
and Owers (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) reported gains of 3.3% received from 
spin-offs (Buckley, 1991). Copeland et al. (1987) further support this view by showing 
spinoffs reported excess returns of 5%. Rosenfeld (1984) reported excess returns of 9.7% for 
spin-offs using a 10 day period prior to the divestiture announcement. Hite and Owers (1983) 
reported excess returns of 7.3% for spin-offs using a 50 day event period. These findings 
were further supported by research utilising a 2-day (-1;0) event window. 
 
Vijh (1994) and Allen et al. (1995) found that divestitures report positive returns of 2.90% 
(significant at the 0.05 level) and 2.15% (significant at the 0.01 level), respectively. Johnson, 
Klein and Thibodeaux (1995;) Seward and Walsh (1996;) and Daley et al. (1997) found 
divestitures to impact shareholder wealth positively reporting returns of 3.96%, 2.6% and 
3.4%, respectively (all significant at the 0.01 level). Recent studies using a 2-day event 
window by Maxwell and Rao (2003) and Dahlum and Tai (2015) found that divestitures have 
a positive impact on firm value. Studies reported positive returns of 3.59% (0;+1) and 5.4% (- 
1;0), respectively. Both sets of results were significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Studies conducted in the US using a 3-day (-1;+1) event window have also found that 
divestitures have a positive impact on firm value. Desai and Jain (1999;) Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999;) and Owen et al. (2010) reported ARs of 3.84%, 3.28%, and 1.57%, 
respectively. Results from these studies were significant at the 0.01 level. Kirchmaier (2003) 
and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) investigated divestitures in Western Europe over a 3-
day event window finding that divestitures reported positive returns of 5.4% and 2.62%, 
respectively (both significant at the 0.01 level). These findings were later supported by 
Sudarsanam and Qian (2007) and Lehtonen (2008) who tested divestiture returns using a 3-
day (- 1;+1) event window. Findings reported positive returns of 4.82% in Sudarsanam and 
Qian (2007) and 1.83% in Lehtonen (2008). Results for both studies were significant at the 
0.01 level. Nguyen (2013) studied divestiture returns for French firms finding that 
divestitures have a positive impact on firm value. This study found that divestitures result in 
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ARs of 0.138% using a 3- day (-1;+1) event window. Fogh (2009) conducted a study 
investigating the short-term effects of divestitures in Danish markets. However, this study 
reported mixed results. This study utilised event windows of 2 days (-1;0), 3 days (-1;+1), 28 
days (-30;-2) prior to the divestiture announcement and 28 days (+2;-30) post the divestiture 
announcement. Fogh (2009) reported returns of 1.79%, 1.57%, -0.02% and -1.97%, 
respectively. However, findings in this study proved not to be statistically significant. Finally, 
Murray (2000) conducted a study assessing the wealth effects of spin-offs on companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE). This study reported negative returns of 0.19% 
using a 3-day (-1;+1) event window. However, these results proved not to be statistically 
significant. 
 
Studies investigating the long-term effects of divestitures on shareholders in developed 
markets have found that divestitures have a negative impact on firm value. Sudarsanam and 
Qian (2007) studied divestitures in Europe and found that divestitures resulted in returns of - 
0.06%, -0.08%, -0.09%, for a period of 12, 24 and 36 months, respectively. However, all 
results in this study proved not to be statistically significant. Lee and Lin (2008) studied 
divestitures in the UK using the same event windows. Findings reported returns of -7.10%, - 
17.45% and -25.84% for a period of 12, 24 and 36 months, respectively. However, these 
results also proved not to be statistically significant. 
 
Studies conducted in developing markets which focussed on countries in Asia have also 
reported positive divestiture returns. Sin and Ariff (2006) and Zakaria and Arnold (2010) 
investigated divestiture returns in Malaysia using a 3-day (-1;+1) event window to study the 
impact of divestitures on firm value. Sin and Ariff (2006) reported that divestitures have a 
positive impact on firm value, reporting positive returns of 1.80% (significant at the 0.10 
level). Zakaria and Arnold (2010) also found that divestitures have a positive impact on firm 
value, reporting positive returns of 4.99% (significant at the 0.05 level). Sun (2012) 
investigated divestiture returns in Taiwan using a 3-day window. This study found that 
divestitures reported positive returns of 0.243% (significant at the 0.05 level). However, a 
study in Asia investigating the impact of divestitures on long-term shareholder wealth found 
that divestitures negatively impact shareholder wealth. Zakaria and Arnold (2010) 
investigated long-term divestiture returns in Malaysia reporting returns of -7.25%, -18.46, -
18.74% for 12, 24 and 36 month periods, respectively. However, these results proved not to 
be statistically significant. 
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Studies investigating the impact of divestitures on firm value for shareholders of South 
African companies have reported mixed results. Blount and Davidson (1996) found that 
divestitures resulted in positive returns of 1.8% using a 59-day (-60;-1) event window. 
However, the results of this study proved not to be statistically significant. Bhana (2006) 
investigated found that divestitures reported positive ARs of 3.37% (significant at the 0.05 
level) using a 6-day (-5;0) event window. Lugisani (2010) found that divestitures report 
positive ARs 5.82% by using an 8-day (-4;+3) event window. However, Joosub et al. (2017) 
reported negative abnormal returns of 12.47% which were not statistically significant. Studies 
focusing on the impact of divestitures on long-term firm value for South African shareholders 
have also reported mixed results. Bhana (2004) reported abnormal returns of 23.2%, 47.6% 
and 61.7% for 12, 24 and 36 month periods, respectively (all results were significant at the 
0.01 level) using the market model. However, Nichols et al. (2014) reported negative 
divestiture returns over the long-term using Arbitrage Pricing Theory to determine 
cumulative abnormal returns. Their study of companies listed on the JSE reported ARs for a 
period analysing days that -250, +250, -500 and 500 days around the announcement date. The 
study reported returns of -0.89%, -1.27%, -0.65% and -1.01%, respectively (all results 
significant at the 0.01 level). 
 
2.4 Determinants of Divestiture Returns 
This section discusses the possible determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa by 
reviewing prior literature. The determinants discussed below include the efficiency effect, the 
size effect and, the leverage effect. 
 
2.4.1 The Efficiency Effect 
Firms use divestitures to improve firm efficiency. Improvements in efficiency can affect ARs 
received from divestitures in a positive manner; however, as efficiency theories were 
discussed in section 2.2, this section discusses methods related to the efficiency effect in line 
with Hillier et al. (2009). Hillier et al. (2009) argue that firms with lower levels of efficiency 
prior to the divestiture report superior ARs than firms with higher levels of efficiency prior to 
the divestiture. Therefore, this study will investigate the effects of firm efficiency (measured 
by ROA) on divestiture returns in line with methods employed by Hillier et al. (2009). Logit 
regressions and a comparison of ARs between firms with lower levels of efficiency and firms 
with higher efficiency levels were used to test the efficiency effect. 
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2.4.2 The Size Effect 
Fama and French (1995) report that when earnings are scaled by the book value of equity, 
smaller firms have lower earnings on average relative to their larger counterparts (Barber & 
Lyon, 1996). However, studies report that the size of the divestiture relative to the overall 
size of the firm has a significant effect on divestiture returns (Zaima & Hearth, 1985; Klein, 
1986; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). This view supported by several authors who argue that firm 
size affects divestiture returns (Schipper & Smith, 1983; Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 
1999; Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983). 
 
Dahlum and Tai (2015) argue that if underperforming segments constrain the firm’s value, 
disposal of an asset that is larger relative to the firm’s overall size would result in a greater 
increase to the value of the firm. Gains would be larger as a result of the divestiture being of a 
larger proportion of the market capitalisation of the overall firm (Dahlum & Tai, 2015). 
Additionally, Hillier et al. (2009) found that smaller firms report higher abnormal returns in 
instances where divestitures are larger in value relative to the firm’s overall size. These 
findings prove to be consistent with Dahlum and Tai (2015). Therefore, the firms’ size may 
have an effect divestiture returns (Asquith, Robert & Mullins, 1983). 
 
Dahlum and Tai (2015) found that divesting firms in their study enjoy significant positive 
ARs of 1.25% in general. However, smaller firms outperformed larger firms by 1.96%. 
Furthermore, smaller firms enjoyed higher ARs (2.47%) versus their larger counterparts 
(0.51%). Dahlum and Tai (2015) also found that smaller firms reported larger percentage 
gains when the absolute gain is fixed. Additionally, spin-offs which are larger relative to the 
size of the firm create more value for shareholders versus divestitures which are lower in size 
(Dahlum & Tai, 2015). Dahlum and Tai (2015) conclude that smaller firms on average 
reported larger gains versus their larger counterparts. This phenomenon is due to the divested 
asset being larger in size relative to the pre-announcement market capitalisation of the firm 
and having a larger effect on the selling firm. However, both Barber and Lyon (1996) and 
Hillier et al. (2009) argue that in determining the impact of divestitures on firm value, it is 
important to control for firm size. Therefore, to determine whether the firm’s size has an 
effect on divestiture returns, this study also included a variable for firm size defined as 
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Ln(TA). Additionally, the firm’s Ln(TA) was also used to determine control firms for firms 
in the sample portfolio. 
 
2.4.3 The Leverage Effect 
Hoskisson and Johnson (1996) found that high levels of leverage tend to foreshadow 
restructuring programmes. Large debt levels may be a symptom of resources which are 
allocated inefficiently or they may provide an indication of the firm’s poor performance in 
general (Nguyen, 2013). Highly-geared firms suffer from larger default risk which can 
restrict the firm’s ability to raise capital. Large debt levels on the balance sheet of the firm 
would increase the firm’s cost of capital, which would negatively impact opportunities to 
raise capital which can be reinvested in projects that can generate value for the firm. In 
addition, large debt levels can lead to corporate restructures due to risks associated with an 
inability to repay financial obligations as firms experience stress on cash flows. Therefore, 
higher levels of debt on the firm’s balance sheet can also be viewed as a source of value 
destruction (Nguyen, 2013). 
 
As a result, the need to correct high debt levels may affect divestiture decisions. This is 
particularly important during periods when more conservative financial control mechanisms 
are enacted on the firm’s operating activities (Nguyen, 2013). These additional measures 
enacted would be used as a form of protection by the firm’s shareholders. However, selling a 
portion of the firm’s operations can alleviate pressure on the firm’s balance sheet which can 
impact the firm’s cost of capital in a positive manner (Nguyen, 2013). Additionally, during 
periods where highly-leveraged firms experience material financial distress costs, divestitures 
can provide a cheaper source of financing if the firm cannot raise capital externally. Firms 
can then reinvest proceeds in value-enhancing projects or the reduction of the firm’s debt. As 
a result, both managers and shareholders can benefit from divestitures. Nguyen (2013) found 
that highly-levered firms report superior ARs versus their lower-levered peers by using a 3-
day (-1;+1) event window as the primary event window. Nguyen (2013) reported that highly-
levered firms produced ARs of 0.56%, however, lower-levered firms reported ARs of 0.42%. 
Findings in this study reported that leverage levels in the year before the divestiture 
announcement possessed a statistically significant impact on divestiture returns. These 
findings were also consistent with Lui (2007) who reported that firms with higher leverage 
levels in Australia reported superior ARs versus their lower-levered peers. Nguyen (2013) 
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also found that the most significant day for ARs earned from divestitures by highly-levered 
firms is the day of the divestiture announcement. AARs of approximately 0.5% (significant at 
the 0.01 level) were reported by highly-levered firms on the day of the divestiture 
announcement. Additionally, Hillier et al. (2009) found that share price reactions to 
divestiture announcements are inversely related to leverage levels following a divestiture and 
Lasfer, Sudarsanam and Taffler (1996) found that financially stressed firms in the United 
States show ardent gains. 
 
2.5 Summary of Literature Review and Formal statement of Hypotheses 
Figure 1. Thesis outline 
 
Source – Author. 
 
Figure 2.1 summarises theories and findings related to divestitures which were reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Section 2.2 discusses theories related to the determinants of divestitures and 
reports that divestiture decisions may be the result of different reasons. A majority of the 
studies conducted in international markets argue that enhancing corporate focus, improving 
Evidence from prior research 
1. Postive -shareholder wealth enhancement. 
2. Negative - erosion of shareholder wealth. 
Theoretical concepts from 
prior studies 
1.  Corporate focus theories 
2. Efficiency theories 
3.  Financing theories 
4. Expropriation theories 
5. Information theories 
6. Governance theories 
Theoretical concepts from prior 
studies 
1.  The efficiency effect 
2. The leverage effect. 
3. The size effect. 
Research question 1: 
What are the 
determinants of 
divestitures in South 
Africa? 
Research question 3 
What are the 
determinants of 
divestiture returns in 
South Africa? 
Research question 2: 
What is the impact of 
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South Africa? 
Informal question 1: 
What makes a 
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portion of its 
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part of its business, 
does it create value 
for shareholders?  
Informal question 3: 
Now that a company 
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portion sold part of its 
business, where does 
this value come from?  
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corporate efficiency and reducing the firm’s leverage levels are some of the most important 
determinants of divestiture decisions. Therefore to answer the first research provided in 
figure 2.1 the following hypothesis was tested: 
 
i. Hypothesis 1: 
H0: Enhancing corporate focus, improving firm efficiency and the firm’s leverage levels are 
statistically significant determinants of divestitures in South Africa. 
Ha: Enhancing corporate focus, improving firm efficiency and the firm’s leverage levels do 
not possess statistical significance as determinants of divestitures in South Africa. 
 
Section 2.3 discusses prior literature related to the impact of divestitures on short-term firm 
value. Studies have reported mixed results in different markets including South Africa. 
However, the majority of studies have shown that divestitures have a positive impact on 
short-term firm value. Therefore, to the second research question provided in figure 2.1, the 
following hypothesis was tested: 
 
ii. Hypothesis 2: 
H0: Divestitures either have no impact or a negative impact on short-term firm value in South 
Africa. 
Ha: Divestitures have a positive impact on short-term firm value in South Africa resulting in 
shareholder wealth enhancement.  
 
Finally, section 2.4 discusses prior literature related to the determinants of divestiture returns. 
Studies report that divestiture returns may not only stem from the divestiture decision itself 
but may be influenced by the effects of efficiency, leverage and firm size. Therefore, to 
answer the third research question, provided in figure 2.1, the following hypothesis was 
tested: 
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iii. Hypothesis 3:  
H0: Efficiency, firm size or leverage in the year prior to the divestiture are not statistically 
significant determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. 
Ha: Efficiency, firm size or leverage in the year prior to the divestiture are statistically 
significant determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. 
 
Finally, building on hypothesis three this study also investigated the relative performance 
between subsamples of the original portfolio. Prior literature has reported that firms with 
lower levels of corporate efficiency prior to the divestiture announcement report superior 
returns, firms with higher leverage prior to the divestiture announcement report superior 
abnormal returns and smaller firms prior to the divestiture announcement report higher 
returns. Therefore, to expand on the third research question, the following hypotheses were 
tested: 
 
iv. Hypothesis 3(a):  
H0: Firms with higher ROAs in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
Ha: Firms with lower ROAs in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
 
v. Hypothesis 3(b):  
H0: Larger firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
Ha: Smaller firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
 
vi. Hypothesis 3(c):  
H0: Lower-levered firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
Ha: Highly-levered firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The study aims to investigate the determinants of divestiture decisions, the impact of 
divestitures on short-term firm value and the determinants of divestiture returns in South 
Africa. Section 3.2 discusses data and section 3.3 discusses the methods used to determine 
the effects of divestitures on shareholder wealth in South Africa.  
 
3.2  Data 
Section 3.2.1 details the process used to obtain data for the purposes of the study and 
discusses population and sample characteristics. Section 3.2.2 provides definitions of the 
variables used. Finally, section 3.2.3 summarises and discusses statistics related to the study. 
 
3.2.1 Population and Sample Characteristics 
Studies investigating divestitures analyse voluntary divestitures and their effects on 
shareholder wealth (Alexander et al., 1987; Bhana, 2006; Hiller et al., 2009). Additionally, 
Nichols et al. (2014) state that sells-offs and spin-offs are the most common forms of 
divestitures in South Africa. Therefore, this study discusses the effects of divestitures on 
shareholders of South African firms by analysing voluntary sell-offs and spin-offs. The 
population consists of all firms listed on the JSE between 2000 and 2014. This observation 
period is longer than periods previously used by studies in South Africa. Bhana (2006), 
observed divestitures for a period of 7 years (1995-2001), Lugisani (2010) covered a period 
of 4 years (2005-2009) and Joosub et al. (2017) observed a period of 9 years (2002-2011). 
Data collected for the purposes of the study followed the below process
1
: 
 
i. A comprehensive list of companies listed on the JSE.  
ii. A comprehensive list of companies that executed divestitures.   
iii. Financial statements prior to the divestiture should be readily available as these will 
be used in analysing the determinants of divestiture decisions and the determinants 
of divestiture returns discussed in section 3.3.  
                                                          
1
 Data sources used in this study are detailed in App. II-B (pg. 91-92). 
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iv. Share price data for all companies to be included in the sample should be available 
for a period of at least 151 days prior to the divestiture announcement and a period 
of at least 30 days post the divestiture announcement. 
 
A total of 476 transactions between 1994 and 2014 were provided. However, only 174 
transactions fell within the observation period of 2000-2014. Additionally, to confirm 
whether these transactions were indeed divestitures, JSE Sens announcements were used to 
understand the details of each transaction provided. Following this, the following criterion 
was also applied in order for each transaction to be included in the sample:  
 
i. The selling firm should be listed on the JSE. 
ii. In line with Bhana (2006) and Hillier et al. (2009) transactions by financial firms 
were eliminated from the population. 
iii. In order to calculate the parameters used in the estimation process of the market 
model following event study methodology, share price data should be available 
between t-151 and t+30. 
iv. Share price data should also be available for a period of 30 days prior to the 
divestiture announcement and for a period of 30 days post the divestiture 
announcement.  
v. To minimise the confounding effects of other restructuring events, firms which 
announced other contemporaneous restructuring programmes within the period of 
(t-30; t+30) were eliminated from the sample. This elimination process was adopted 
to reduce any contamination on divestiture returns associated with a further 
unbundling during the event window. Furthermore, this method is in line with Bates 
(2005;) Bhana (2006) and Nichols et al. (2014).  
vi. If the parent firm sold the same business in tranches or over several transactions 
within the test period, the date of the last transaction was included as the reference 
date in the sample. 
vii. Finally, financial statement data should be available. For example, sales figures 
were used as an independent variable to investigate whether corporate focus was a 
determinant of divestitures and section 3.2.2 discusses all the variables used for the 
purposes of this study.   
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Applying the above process resulted in a final sample of 46 divestiture transactions which 
were included in the study.  
 
3.2.2 Definitions of Variables 
This section provides definitions of the variables used for the purposes of the study, in 
conjunction with defining control (non-divesting) firms that were used as matching firms. 
The inclusion of control firms in studying the determinants of divestiture decisions is 
consistent with Hillier et al. (2009).  
 
3.2.2.1 Determinants of Divestitures 
Corporate focus, efficiency and leverage were used as variables to investigate the 
determinants of divestitures. Information for these variables was obtained from financial 
statements of firms in both the sample portfolio and the control group. Prior to defining the 
variables used as determinants of divestitures, the process for obtaining matching (control) 
firms is discussed below.  
 
i. Control Firms 
To investigate the determinants of divestitures in South Africa, this study uses the logit 
regression model. This method calls for a divesting (sample) firm to be matched with a non-
divesting (control) firm. Mitigation of the skewness bias was the motivating factor behind the 
use of control firms as opposed to a reference portfolio as the benchmark in return 
calculations (Gur-Gershgoren, Hughson & Zender, 2008). Additionally, the method of using 
matching firms and sample firms is similar to methods employed in previous studies (Hillier 
et al., 2009; Sun, 2012). Authors have also used control firms when investigating the effects 
of divestitures on shareholder wealth (Kaplan, 1989; Denis & Denis, 1993; DeGeorge & 
Zeckhauser, 1993).   
 
For the purposes of this study control firms had to be of a similar size as the sample firm. 
Control firms were initially identified by obtaining comparable firms using Bloomberg’s 
“relative valuation subgroup” tool. If this information was not available, then the sample 
firm’s financial statements were used to identify a competitor firm. If this information was 
also unavailable, then the sample firm’s JSE sector code was utilised to obtain comparable 
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firms within the same sector. After the identification of comparable firms, a firm with a 
Ln(TA) that is closest to that of the sample firm’s Ln(TA) was chosen as the control firm. 
However, an additional requirement was also used for non-divesting firms according to Sun 
(2012). The control firm should not be engaged in any divestiture or restructuring activity 
during the same financial year as the divestiture transaction of the sample firm. 
 
ii. Corporate focus  
To measure corporate focus the study used two variables as proxies for corporate focus. In 
line with Berger and Ofek (1999) the firm’s sales growth and CEO Turnover were both used 
to measure corporate focus. Berger and Ofek (1999) found that sales growth is a statistically 
significant determinant of divestitures. Additionally, CEO Turnover has been used in a 
number of studies on divestitures (Afshar et al., 1992; Berger & Ofek, 1999; Hillier et al., 
2009). 
 
Sales growth is defined as the percentage difference in sales between year t-2 and year t-1 
relative to the divestiture announcement. This period to measure sales growth is consistent 
with the measurement period used by Berger and Ofek (1999). Gerald and Elisifa (2013) 
argue that sales growth is an important financial metric that firms take into consideration 
when formulating an overall corporate strategy. Shareholders and other stakeholders can use 
this metric to measure the overall performance of the firm. A sustained period of poor 
revenue levels can lead to an erosion of the firm’s value. Therefore, by exercising their 
ownership rights and executing a divestiture in order to refocus the firm on its core revenue-
generating segments by selling underperforming segments, shareholders would use poor sales 
growth as a form of corporate control. 
 
CEO Turnover is defined as whether the firm’s CEO has been replaced during a 12-month 
period that precedes the divestiture announcement up until 1 month after the divestiture 
announcement. This definition of CEO Turnover is consistent with Berger and Ofek (1999). 
During periods of sustained underperformance, shareholders may change the firm’s 
leadership to exercise control on the firm. This is due to the incumbent CEO’s reluctance to 
dispose of non-performing assets. Therefore, the inclusion of CEO Turnover as a measure of 
corporate focus takes into account the benefits associated with “the new CEO effect”. New 
CEOs may be more objective in assessing the firm’s performance and sell underperforming 
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assets during periods of corporate restructuring and restructure the firm’s operating strategy 
(Dennis & Shome, 2005). 
 
iii. Efficiency  
Accounting based performance information was used to measure firm efficiency. To measure 
firm efficiency the firm’s ROA and ROE were calculated in the year prior to the divestiture 
announcement and is consistent with methods employed by Daley et al. (1997;) Desai and 
Jain (1999;) and Hillier et al. (2009).  
 
ROA is defined as the firm’s EBITDA relative to its TA which is consistent with Hillier et al. 
(2009). ROE was also included in the study as it is a key measure of the firm’s use of 
invested capital. ROE is defined as the firm’s net profit for the year relative to its TE in a 
specific year. The definition of ROE is consistent with Hoskisson and Hitt (1990;) Hoskisson, 
Hitt, Johnson and Moesel (1993;) and Keats (1990).  
 
iv. Size 
Dahlum and Tai (2015) argue that firm size is a statistically significant determinant of 
divestiture returns. Therefore, firm size was also included in the study. The firm’s Ln(TA) in 
the financial year preceding the divestiture announcement which was used as a proxy for firm 
size. Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel (1994;) and Gill, Biger, Pai and Bhutani (2009) have 
supported the use of Ln(TA) as a proxy for firm size.  
 
v. Leverage 
Firms can use divestitures as a process to reduce financial constraints associated with high 
leverage levels (Nguyen, 2013). Therefore, leverage can be an important financial metric in 
divestiture decisions. For the purposes of this study, the D-t-A and D-t-E ratios of the firm in 
the year preceding the divestiture announcement were used as measures of long-term 
leverage. The inclusion of D-t-A and D-t-E to study whether leverage is a determinant of 
divestitures is consistent with a study conducted by Nguyen (2013). These figures were used 
to measure whether leverage is a statistically significant determinant of divestitures and 
whether leverage is a statistically significant determinant of divestiture returns. Additionally, 
short-term debt measures of the current ratio and the interest coverage ratio were also 
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calculated in the year prior to the divestiture announcement. Inclusion of these variables is in 
line with Hiller et al. (2009).  
 
D-t-A is defined as the long-term debt of the firm relative to the book value of its TA. D-t-E 
is defined as the long-term debt of the firm relative to the book value of its TE. These 
definitions are consistent with Hillier et al. (2009). The D-t-A ratio may provide information 
related to how the firm financed prior acquisition activity (Hofstrand, 2013). Additionally, 
investors use this ratio to evaluate the firm’s ability in meeting its financial obligations 
associated with risks related to a potential default (Hofstrand, 2013). The D-t-E ratio is of 
vital importance to the firm’s investors as it reports the proportion of capital invested by the 
firm’s equity holders versus other forms of debt (Hofstrand, 2013). Additionally, D-t-E 
provides shareholders with a measurement tool which distinguishes between what the firm 
actually borrowed versus other forms of liabilities (Hofstrand, 2013). Finally, the current 
ratio, defined as the current assets of the firm relative to its current liabilities, and the interest 
coverage ratio, defined as the interest expense of the firm relative to its PBIT were included. 
These measures provide information related to the short-term health of the overall firm. 
 
3.2.2.2 Divestitures and Firm Value 
CARs were used to measure the impact of divestitures on firm value. The process of 
obtaining CARs is discussed in section 3.3. Analysing CARs to determine the impact of 
divestitures on shareholder wealth is consistent with several studies (Afshar et al., 1992; 
Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Bhana, 2006; Hillier et al., 2009; Owen et al., 2010; Zakaria & 
Arnold, 2010; Nguyen, 2013).  
 
i. CARs 
The primary event window used to determine the impact of divestitures on firm value for the 
purposes of this study was a period of 5 days
2
. This event window provides a view of the 
effects that divestitures have on short-term firm value prior to the divestiture announcement 
and post the announcement. Additionally, this event window is in line with the 3
rd
 event 
                                                          
2
 Cumulative abnormal returns for the 5-day event window are determined using the 
following formula: CAR t = CARt-1 + ARt for t = -2 to +2. The method used to obtain CARs 
is discussed in section 3.3.3. 
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window used by Dahlum and Tai (2015). This event window also provides an alternative to 
event windows used in studies conducted in South Africa (Bhana, 2006; Lugisani, 2010; 
Joosub et al., 2017). The study also used alternative event windows of 6 days (-5;0) which 
measures share price movements prior to the divestiture announcement. This event window 
was also used in Bhana (2006). Additionally, a 3-day (-1;+1) event window was also used as 
an alternative event window for the purposes of this study. This event window has been used 
to study the impact of divestitures on firm value by several studies (Sudarsanam & Qian, 
2007; Owen et al., 2010; Sun, 2012; Nguyen, 2013) and measures the impact of divestitures 
on firm value before and after the divestiture announcement. Finally, a 21-day (-10;+10) 
event window was also used for the purposes of this study which is consistent with Nguyen 
(2013). 
 
3.2.2.3 Determinants of Divestiture Returns 
Methods used to study the determinants of divestiture returns are in line with Hillier et al. 
(2009). To study the efficiency effect the firm’s ROA was utilised, to measure the leverage 
effect the firm’s D-t-A was used, and to measure the size effect the firm’s Ln(TA) was 
utilised. Cross-sectional regressions were conducted using these variables which were 
obtained from financial statement data in the year before the divestiture announcement. 
Additionally, comparisons of ARs using subsamples of the original sample portfolio were 
conducted in line with methods employed by Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). Miles and 
Rosenfeld used this method to measure the performance of spin-offs between smaller and 
larger firms. 
 
3.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1: Frequency distribution of divestiture announcements 
Year No. of 
transactions 
Percentage 
of the sample 
Year No. of 
transactions 
Percentage 
of the sample 
2000 13 28% 2008 3 7% 
2001 4 9% 2009 1 2% 
2002 3 7% 2010 5 11% 
2003 2 4% 2011 5 11% 
2004 1 2% 2012 2 4% 
2005 1 2% 2013 0 0% 
42 
 
2006 1 2% 2014 0 0% 
2007 5 11%    
 Total      46 100% 
 
Table 3.2: Industry or JSE sector of sample firms 
Industry 
No. of 
observation 
Industry No. of 
observation 
Technology & Hardware 3 Consumer Discretionary - Consumer 
Services 
1 
Mining & Industrials 9 Consumer Discretionary - 
Educational Services 
1 
Communications - Media & 
Entertainment 
1 Transport & Automotive 5 
Information Technology 
Business 
5 Office Electronics and Products 1 
Telecommunications 1 General Industrials 8 
Real Estate 3 Consumer Discretionary - Retail 
Department Stores 
2 
Industrial Engineering 1 Consumer Discretionary - Food & 
Beverages 
5 
Total     46 
 
Table 3.1 presents information related to divestiture activity in South Africa during the 15-
year observation period studied. Table 3.1 shows that most of the divestitures executed 
during the observation period occurred between 2000 and 2002. This period coincides with 
an economic downturn in South Africa between 2000 and 2001
3
. Additionally, this period 
coincides with an economic downturn in global markets following the dot com bubble burst.  
Increasing corporate focus on the firm’s core revenue-generating segments could have been a 
motivating factor behind divestiture decisions, as companies would have experienced stresses 
to profitability during this period. Following this period divestiture activity subsided in line 
with an economic recovery between 2002 and 2007. However, divestiture activity rebounded 
between 2007 and 2008. This period experienced the negative effects associated with the 
subprime mortgage crisis which had a negative impact on global financial markets. 
                                                          
3
 See South Africa GDP graph in App. II-C (p. 95).  
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Additionally, the South African economy also experienced a downturn during this period
3
; 
however, not to the same extent as global markets.  
 
Interestingly, the South African economy grew between 2010 and 2011
3
. However, 
divestiture activity grew during this period. Therefore, enhancing corporate focus may not 
have been a motivating factor in divestitures during this period. Divestitures during this 
period may have been motivated by the need to reinvest capital in the firm or may have been 
motivated by the need to diversify revenue streams. Companies would have been motivated 
to sell portions of the firm to use proceeds from divestitures as a form of capital used to 
expand into new markets; thereby, diversifying their revenue streams. On the other hand, 
proceeds may have been used to repay financial obligations. Another viewpoint would 
support the need to repay shareholders or increase the concentration of shareholder by using 
share buy-back strategies. Table 3.2 shows that industries which had the largest number of 
divestitures in South Africa during the observation period were from the mining industry and 
the general industrials sectors. These were followed by companies in the transport and 
automotive, food and beverage and information technology sectors, which are some of South 
Africa’s largest sectors which contribute to economic output. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the methods used in answering this study’s research questions. Section 
3.3.1 discusses methods used to investigate the determinants of divestitures. Section 3.3.2 
discusses event study methodology used to investigate the impact of divestitures on short-
term firm value for the purposes of this study. Finally, section 3.3.3 discusses methods 
utilised in studying the determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. 
 
3.3.2 Determinants of Divestitures 
The study begins by investigating which determinants had a statistically significant impact on 
divestiture decisions in South Africa. The study begins by conducting univariate tests, which 
are followed by an analysis using logit regressions. Analysing results from both univariate 
tests and logit regressions is consistent with methods employed by Hillier et al. (2009). In 
order to study which variables had an effect on divestiture decisions “Sale” which denotes 
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whether a firm executed a divestiture was set as the dependent variable. Explanatory 
variables were then regressed against the dependent variable using logit regressions. This 
method is in line with Hillier et al. (2009). Additionally, studies have found that firm size has 
a positive relation to announcement returns (Klein, 1986; Dahlum & Tai, 2015). Therefore, 
this study also includes a variable for firm size as a control measure. The formula for this test 
can be expressed in a linear equation as follows: 
 
                               Salej= α + β1FOCUS + β2Efficiency+ β3DEBT + β4SIZE + εj....         (3.1) 
Where: 
 SALE is a binary variable that takes the value of one for a sample firm and zero 
for control firms.  
 DEBT and Efficiency are as previously defined. 
 FOCUS is based on both Sales growth and CEO Turnover as previously defined 
 SIZE is based on Ln(TA) as previously defined. 
 
3.3.3 Divestitures and Firm Value 
To measure the effects of divestitures on short-term firm value, the study used event study 
methodology according to Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). Fama et al. (1969) used 
event study methodology to investigate the effects of stock-splits on firm share prices. 
However, event study methodology continues to be the primary method used for measuring 
stock-mean and cumulative-mean abnormal returns (Khotari & Warner, 2006). Other 
methods such as the Buy-and-Hold approach, calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns and 
the calendar-time regression model have also been used in event study methodology. 
However, these methods suffer from statistical issues (Qian, 2006).  
 
Event study methodology using the market model has been used by several studies to 
determine the impact of divestitures on short-term firm value (Alexander et al., 1984; Afshar 
et al., 1992; Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Bhana, 2006; Lehtonen, 2008; Fogh, 2009; Hillier et 
al., 2009; Lugisani, 2010; Owen et al., 2010; Nguyen, 2013; Joosub et al., 2017). However, to 
determine whether returns significantly impact firm value involves a methodical process 
which requires the following steps:  
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i. Determination of the estimation period, 
ii. Setting the event window or windows, 
iii. Calculation of average abnormal returns (AARs) by using the market model, 
iv. Calculating cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), 
v. Conducting statistical tests on both average abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns to determine the statistical significance of returns obtained in the 
study. 
 
3.3.3.1 The Estimation Period 
For returns to be considered “normal” an estimation period is utilised to provide a proxy or 
benchmark for the return. However, scholars have differing opinions regarding the duration 
of the estimation period. MacKinlay (1997) argues that an estimation period of 120 days is 
sufficient. Benninga and Voetman (2008) argue that 252 trading days are sufficient for an 
estimation period. Strong (1992) also shows that estimation periods as short as 60 days and as 
long as 600 days can also be used. However, to minimise systemic risk changes, the 
estimation period should be long enough to reduce daily return variances to a minimum but 
should also be short enough to take into account price differentials of a recent period (Strong, 
1992). Therefore, this study follows MacKinlay (1997) by using a period between t-151 and 
t-31 to estimate the parameters used for the OLS regression.  
 
3.3.3.2 The Event window  
After establishing the estimation period, the event window used in calculating ARs for the 
purposes of the study was determined. Bhana (2006) argues that the event window should 
observe returns a few days prior to the divestiture (event) announcement and/or a few days 
post the event date. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) argue that leakages of information tend to 
occur prior to an event (divestiture announcement). Their argument supports the view that 
market rumours may have an influence on abnormal returns. Additionally, a disadvantage of 
using extended event windows is that market reactions may be less distinct due to the 
inclusion of more “normal” trading days (Bhana, 2006). This can affect any results seen in 
the movement of share prices. Following these recommendations, an event window of 5 days 
was used as the primary event window for the purposes of this study. This period includes 2 
days before the event date and 2 days following the event date. This event window is also in 
line with the 3
rd
 event window of Dahlum and Tai (2015) and provides an alternative window 
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from prior studies conducted in South Africa (Blount & Davidson, 1992; Bhana, 2006; 
Lugisani, 2010; Joosub et al., 2017). 
 
3.3.3.3 Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
Prior to calculating AARs which are used to obtain CARs that study the impact of 
divestitures on short-term firm value, ARs for each security in the sample need to be 
calculated on each day during the estimation period. Bhana (2006) argues that a filtering out 
of share price movements due to normal circumstances needs to be completed. Therefore, the 
method used to determine ARs for the purposes of this study is in line with methods 
employed by Bhana (2006). However, the market model approach states that the return for 
each security can be expressed as a linear function of the contemporaneous return on the 
market portfolio and a firm-specific stochastic term (Bhana, 2006).  
 
Coefficients for the market model were estimated over a 120-day period (t-151; t-31) with the 
announcement date (t=0) for each security being used as the reference date for each security. 
Residual (ARs) were then calculated for the primary event window of 5 days, defined as 2 
days prior to the divestiture announcement and 2 days post the divestiture announcement. The 
AR on any day should not be significantly different from zero unless investors receive new 
information that affects the intrinsic value of a share. Any significant ARs observed can be 
attributed to the information content of the divestiture (Bhana, 2006). Additionally, ARs were 
also calculated for all the alternative event windows in this study. The market model is 
defined as the residual difference between the actual return on day t and the expected return 
on day t using the parameters. This can be expressed as a linear equation as follows: 
 
                                                      ARit = Rit – (αi + βi Rmt) + eit                                                                (3.2) 
Where: 
 ARit represents the abnormal return for security i on day t.  
 Rit is the actual stock market return of security i on day t. Rmt is the rate of return 
of the market portfolio represented by the JSE All Share Index on day t. αi and βi 
are the market model coefficients for company i. This method incorporates an 
event period that includes both pre and post the divestiture announcement. 
 Residuals for the event windows are then calculated for 5 days (t-2;t+2), 3 days (t-
1;t+1), 6 days (t-5;t=0) and 21 days (t-10;t+10). Any significant abnormal returns 
observed in the measurement period can be attributed to the information content 
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of the divestiture itself (Bhana, 2006). Additionally, the measured abnormal return 
on any day in any of the measurement periods should not be significantly different 
from zero unless investors receive new information that affects the intrinsic value 
of a share Bhana (2006).  
 
3.3.3.4 Average Abnormal Returns (AARs)  
After calculating ARs for each security, AARs across the entire sample were calculated for 
each day pre and post the divestiture announcement. The method used to calculate AARs is 
consistent with Bhana (2006) and can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                                
     
 
   
 
                                                         (3.3) 
 
Where: 
                                             
 N = number of firms in the sample portfolio (46 sample firms.) 
 
i. Statistical Tests: AARs 
Statistical significance for AARs is inferred by calculating t-statistics which is in line with 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). This method is also consistent with methods of determining 
t-statistics used by Afshar et al. (1992) and Bhana (2006). The equation for determining t-
statistics can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                               AARt /                                                     (3.4) 
Where: 
 AARt =                                                               (3.4.1) 
   (AARt)  = 
       
                   
 
   
                                 (3.4.2) 
 And             
   
      
   
                                     (3.4.3) 
Where: 
 N is the number of sell-off announcements in the sample portfolio.  
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3.3.3.5 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
CARs for each day were calculated for each day of the event window, after obtaining AARs 
for the entire sample on each day in the event window. Malatesta and Thompson (1985) and 
Eckbo (2014) argue that CARs only receive an economic benefit from the unanticipated 
component which is captured. Partial anticipation constitutes a portion of the wealth creation 
effects prior to the occurrence of the event such as a divestiture (Eckbo, 2014). However, 
observing the impact of divestitures on firm value by using CARs is in line with studies 
conducted by Afshar et al. (1992;) Hillier et al. (2009;) Bhana (2006;) Sun (2012;) and 
Nguyen (2013). CARs are defined as the sum of all the AARs for the event window and can 
be expressed in a linear equation as follows:  
 
                                                                         
  
    
                                            (3.5) 
Where: 
 t1 and t2 represent the beginning and the end of the event window, respectively. 
 
Alternatively the above formula may be expressed in the following manner:  
 
                                                  CARt = CARt-1 + ARt for t = -2 to +2 …                         (3.5.1) 
Source: Bhana (2006) 
 
i. Statistical Tests: CARs 
Statistical significance is inferred by calculating t-statistics. The determination of test 
statistics for CARs followed methods employed by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985;) Afshar 
et al. (1992;) Bhana (2006;) and Lehtonen (2008) which can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                                
    
                    
                                             (3.6) 
 
3.3.3.6 Robustness Test 
BHARs were used as a test for robustness for the purposes of this study. Using BHARs as a 
test for robustness is in line with methods employed Desai and Jain (1999;) Owen et al. 
(2010;) and Nichols et al. (2014). BHARs were calculated for each firm in the entire sample. 
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BHARs were then analysed for both the primary event window and for all alternative event 
windows used for the purposes of this study. BHARs can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    , (3.7) 
Source: Nichols, Rosenberg, Majoni & Mukanjari (2014). 
 
Where:  
 T represents the number of days being examined for each event window.  
 E[Rit] represents the expected return for company i at time t, and the expected return 
was calculated using historical returns defined as the average of the returns of 
company i on time t-151 to t-31.  
 
3.3.4 Determinants of Divestiture Returns 
A majority of prior studies have discussed the benefits of divestitures on short-term 
shareholder wealth (Alexander et al., 1984; Afshar et al., 1992; Desai & Jain; 1999; Mulherin 
& Boone, 2000; Bhana, 2006; Hillier et al., 2009; Lee & Madhavan, 2010; Owen et al., 2010; 
Nguyen, 2013). However, to contribute to the body of knowledge on divestiture research in 
South Africa, this study goes further by studying the determinants of divestiture returns. To 
study the determinants of divestiture returns, CARs of the sample portfolio were set as the 
dependent variable in line with Bhana (2006) and Hillier et al. (2009). A cross-sectional 
analysis of OLS regressions was then conducted using ROA (a measure of corporate 
efficiency) and D-t-A (a measure of leverage) as explanatory variables. Additionally, studies 
report that firm size has a positive relation to divestiture returns and that firm size has an 
effect on divestiture returns (Klein, 1986; Dahlum & Tai, 2015). Therefore, a measure for 
firm size was also included as an explanatory variable and this can be in a linear equation as 
follows:  
 
                                    CARt= α + β1Efficiencyt-1+ β2Sizet-1+β3Leveraget-1 +εj …             (3.8) 
 
Where: 
 CAR is defined as the cumulative abnormal returns in the 5-day (-2;+2) event 
window. 
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  Efficiency is measured as ROA of the firm, as previously defined. 
 Debt is measured as D-t-A, as previously defined. 
 Size is measured as Ln(TA), as previously defined. 
 
Additionally, to provide a further understanding related to the determinants of divestiture 
returns in South Africa this study also analysed CARs using subsamples from the original 
portfolio of divesting firms (see section 4.4.2). Comparisons of ARs between smaller firms 
and larger firms, firms with higher ROAs and firms with lower ROAs, and highly-levered 
firms versus lower-levered firms were conducted in this study in line with methods employed 
by Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) compared ARs between smaller 
and larger spin-offs in their study. Their study found that that larger spin-offs (defined as the 
divested asset having an equity value at least 10% as large as the market value of the parent 
firm’s common stock) reported superior ARs than smaller spin-offs (defined as the divested 
asset having an equity value lower than 10% of the parent firm’s equity value).  
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents results obtained in the study and discusses findings related to the 
determinants of divestitures and divestiture returns in South Africa. Section 4.2 presents and 
discusses findings related to the determinants of divestiture transactions. Section 4.3 presents 
and discusses findings related to the impact of divestitures on short-term firm value. Finally, 
section 4.4 provides an analysis of the determinants of divestiture returns.  
 
4.2 Determinants of Divestitures 
To answer the first research question, this section discusses findings from tests conducted to 
answer the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: 
H0: Enhancing corporate focus, improving firm efficiency and the firm’s leverage levels are 
statistically significant determinants of divestitures in South Africa. 
Ha: Enhancing corporate focus, improving firm efficiency and the firm’s leverage levels do 
not possess statistical significance as determinants of divestitures in South Africa. 
 
Section 4.2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the eight variables used as determinants of 
divestitures. Table 4.2.1 Panel A, discusses the findings of univariate tests conducted which 
relate to corporate focus as a determinant of divestitures in South Africa. Table 4.2.1 Panel B 
discusses the findings of univariate tests conducted which relate to firm efficiency as a 
determinant of divestitures in South Africa. Table 4.2.1 Panel C discusses the findings of 
univariate tests conducted which relate to leverage as a determinant of divestitures in South 
Africa. Following this, section 4.2.2 discusses findings from logit regressions conducted to 
determine which variables possess statistical significance as determinants of divestitures in 
South Africa
4
.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 Logit regressions were conducted using IBM SPSS version 25. For detailed results, see App. 
III-B (p. 96-101). 
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4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.2.1 Panel A: Descriptive statistics related to corporate focus 
  Variable  Sample Firms Control Firms 
 
Panel A: Corporate Focus Characteristics 
  
Corporate Focus    
 Sales Growth Mean 2.5051 0.2324 
  Median [0.1373] [0.1459] 
  25% -1.76% -1.04% 
  75% 41.69% 34.29% 
  % positive 69.57% 67.39% 
  Variance 20427.1% 12.50% 
 CEO Turnover Mean 0.1957*** 0.0217*** 
  Median [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** 
 25% 0.00 0.00 
 75% 1.00 1.00 
 % positive 17.39% 2.17% 
 Variance 14.69% 2.17% 
***;**;* denotes significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. Control firms are selected based on 
the method discussed in section 3.2.2.1. Means and medians are reported following Hillier et al. (2009). P-
values were calculated using the two-tailed sample method. T-statistics were determined using the difference in 
means between the sample and control portfolio and the method is detailed in App. III.A (pg. 95-96).  
 
Sales growth is defined as the percentage difference in the sales figure between t-2 and t-1. 
Table 4.2.1 Panel A illustrates that sample firms reported superior sales growth than firms in 
the control group (2.5051 vs. 0.2324). However, sales growth did not prove to be a 
statistically significant determinant of divestiture transactions in South Africa. These findings 
are consistent with Berger and Ofek (1999) who reported that sales growth is not a 
statistically significant determinant of divestiture decisions. Findings suggest that divestiture 
decisions in South Africa may have been influenced by another reason than an improvement 
in revenue figures.  
 
Table 4.2.1 Panel A also reports findings related to CEO Turnover. Divesting (sample) firms 
report a significantly higher CEO Turnover figure than non-divesting (control) firms. 
Findings are consistent with Afshar et al. (1992) who argue that CEO Turnover should be 
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higher for sample firms than CEO Turnover for control firms. Additionally, CEO Turnover 
proved to be a statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) determinant of divestiture 
transactions. Findings are consistent with John and Ofek (1995;) Denis and Shome (2005;) 
and Hillier et al. (2009), and provide evidence that a change in leadership of the firm remains 
an important determinant of divestiture decisions. Changes to leadership suggest that 
shareholders of divesting firms look to take advantage of the new CEO effect. Dennis and 
Shome (2005) argue that employing a new CEO can lead to enhancement of the firm’s 
performance. Incumbent CEOs may be afraid to admit past mistakes; however, new CEOs 
may be objective in assessing the overall corporate structure. Therefore, new CEOs in highly-
diversified firms tend to sell off divisions which do not possess a strategic fit with the overall 
firm than their counterparts that are already employed by the firm (John & Ofek, 1995).  
 
Table 4.2.1 Panel B: Descriptive statistics related to efficiency 
  Variable  Sample Firms Control Firms 
Panel B: Operating characteristics    
Efficiency     
 ROA Mean 0.0608*** 0.1996*** 
  Median [0.1031]*** [0.1373]*** 
  25% 1.53% 8.75% 
  75% 20.10% 28.79% 
  % positive 80.43% 91.30% 
  Variance 10.00% 3.25% 
 ROE Mean -0.3576 0.2163 
  Median [0.1139] [0.2110] 
  25% 3.81% 7.19% 
  75% 29.44% 30.95% 
  % positive 80.43% 86.96% 
  Variance 634.05% 7.72% 
***;**;* denotes significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. Control firms are selected based on 
the method discussed in section 3.2.2.1. Means and medians are reported following Hillier et al. (2009). P-
values were calculated using the two-tailed sample method. T-statistics were determined using the difference in 
means between the sample and control portfolio and the method is detailed in App. III-A (pg. 95-96). 
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Table 4.2.1 Panel B reports findings related to efficiency. ROA is defined as the firm’s 
EBITDA relative to its TA in the year preceding the divestiture announcement. Divesting 
(sample) firms reported a lower ROA versus firms in the control group (0.0608 vs. 0.1996). 
Findings are consistent with John and Ofek (1995) and suggest that sample firms performed 
less efficiently than those of the control group. Additionally, ROA proved to be a statistically 
significant (at the 0.01 level) determinant of divestiture decisions.  Findings are consistent 
with Hillier et al. (2009) and provide evidence that firm efficiency remains an important 
consideration in divestiture decisions. Findings suggest that firms look to enhance efficiency 
with the aim of improving firm value. Firms may sell non-performing assets or can create an 
independent entity through a spin-off in order to remove any non-performing assets from its 
balance sheet.  
 
Table 4.2.1 Panel B also reports findings related to ROE. ROE is defined as the ratio of net 
profit of the firm for the year relative to a firm’s TE in the year before the divestiture 
announcement. Hoskisson and Hitt (1990) argue that shareholders would possess a keen 
interest in the ROE of the firm, as ROE reports how the firm generate returns from capital 
invested its equity holders. Findings from Table 4.2.1 Panel B show that sample firms 
reported a negative ROE of 0.3576 and firms in the control group reported a positive ROE of 
0.2163. Findings suggest that shareholders of sample firms may use divestitures as part of a 
strategy aiming to enhance the firm’s operations in order to enhance returns from capital 
which they invested. However, ROE did not prove to be a statistically significant determinant 
of divestiture decisions. 
 
Table 4.2.1 Panel C: Descriptive statistics related to leverage 
 Variable  Sample Firms Control Firms 
Panel C: Financial Health    
LT DEBT     
 Debt to Assets Mean 0.1656*** 0.2765*** 
  Median [0.1130]*** [0.1616]*** 
  25% 2.77% 10.01% 
  75% 23.21% 22.01% 
  % positive 86.96% 100.00% 
  Variance 3.07% 22.20% 
 Debt to Equity Mean 1.3203** 0.2483** 
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  Median [0.2045]** [0.2510]** 
  25% 5.79% 16.38% 
  75% 53.99% 36.22% 
  % positive 86.96% 97.83% 
  Variance 2104.79% 1419.84% 
ST DEBT     
 Current ratio Mean 3.4770 1.7098 
  Median 1.5145 1.5221 
  25% 1.2031 1.2485 
  75% 3.4806 2.0021 
  % positive 100% 100% 
  Variance 2086.80% 60.96% 
 Interest coverage ratio Mean 0.1994 0.2012 
  Median 0.0702 0.0581 
  25% 0.0004 0.0077 
  75% 0.2954 0.2050 
  % positive 73.91% 84.78% 
  Variance 20.40% 80.15% 
***;**;* denotes significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. Control firms are selected based on 
the method discussed in section 3.2.2.1. Means and medians are reported following Hillier et al. (2009). P-
values were calculated using the two-tailed sample method. T-statistics were determined using the difference in 
means between the sample and control portfolio and the method is detailed in App. III-A (pg. 95-96). 
 
Table 4.2.1 Panel C reports findings related to leverage in the year prior to the divestiture. D-
t-A is defined as the ratio of the firm’s long-term debt to the book value of its TA. D-t-A for 
divesting firms was lower than the control group’s D-t-A (0.1656 vs. 0.2765). The study 
expected to report a higher D-t-A for sample firms than a D-t-A for firms in the control 
group. However, D-t-A still proved to be a significant determinant of divestiture decisions 
(significant at the 0.01 level) which is in line with Lasfer et al. (1996) and Nguyen (2013). 
Findings suggest that managers and shareholders of sample firms consider the firm’s leverage 
to be an important consideration in divestiture decisions. Additionally, findings support the 
view that firms can divest any assets/business units as a form of alleviating the burden of debt 
on a firm’s balance sheet. With less debt on the balance sheet, firms could raise capital in 
external markets or could utilise proceeds received from divestitures to invest in value-
generating projects. Firms could also utilise divestiture proceeds to repay any financial 
obligations that the firm has in order to alleviate pressure on the firm’s balance sheet.  
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Table 4.2.1 Panel C also reports related to D-t-E in the year preceding the divestiture 
announcement. D-t-E is defined as the firm’s long-term debt versus the book value of its TE. 
Sample firms reported a higher D-t-E versus control firms (1.3203 vs. 0.2483) and D-t-E 
proved to be a statistically significant determinant of divestitures (significant at the 0.05 
level). Findings are consistent with Lasfer et al. (1996) and Nguyen (2013) and suggest that 
leverage continues to be an important consideration in divestiture decisions. The D-t-E 
distinguishes between the firm’s borrowings and invested capital from equity holders. 
Therefore, shareholders would be keenly aware of the firm’s D-t-E as it provides an 
indication of how the firm finances any investments or operating activities.  
 
Finally, the current ratio, defined as the firm’s current assets versus its current liabilities, and 
the interest coverage ratio, defined as the ratio of between the firm’s interest expense and its 
PBIT were also reported in Table 4.2.1 Panel C. However, both measures proved not to be 
statistically significant. 
 
4.2.2 Logit Regressions 
As seen in Table 4.2.1 univariate tests report that CEO Turnover, ROA, D-t-E and D-t-A 
prove to be the only statistically significant determinants of divestitures. Findings confirm 
that corporate focus, efficiency, and long-term leverage prove to be important determinants of 
the divestitures for firms in South Africa. However, to better understand which variables 
affect the divestiture decision, this study conducted logit regressions using all eight variables 
as explanatory variables for the decision to divest or not (that is “sale” was set as the 
dependent variable).  
 
Table 4.2.2: Logit regressions - determinants of divestiture transactions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -0.043 (0.981) -0.500 (0.758) 0.255 (0.872) 
Sales growth -0.003 (0.514)   
CEO Turnover -2.396 (0.053) -2.370 (0.032)**  
ROA 0.023 (0.207) 0.027 (0.034)** 0.028 (0.028)** 
ROE 0.546 (0.609)   
Debt to Equity -0.108 (0.324) -0.128 (0.198) -0.133 (0.182) 
Debt to Assets 1.900 (0.310) 2.061 (0.151) 3.186 (0.083) 
Current Ratio -0.296 (0.310)   
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Interest coverage ratio 0.270 (0.467)   
Ln(TA) 0.020 (0.866) -0.005 (0.963) -0.076 (0.478) 
Log likelihood 
(Probability) 
95.762 (0.000) 106.690 (0.001) 113.927 (0.009) 
No. Of Observation 96 96 96 
Pearson Chi-Square 81.891 (0.483) 89.075 (0.253) 86.140 (0.299) 
***;**;* denotes significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Table 4.2.2 presents the results of logit regressions used in investigating the determinants of 
divestiture in South Africa. Table 4.2.2 reports that CEO Turnover is a statistically significant 
determinant of divestitures (significant at the 0.05 level) and findings confirm results from 
univariate tests conducted in section 4.2.1. Findings are also consistent with Berger and Ofek 
(1999;) Denis and Shome (2005;) and Hillier et al. (2009). Results of logit regressions 
support the view that changing the firm’s CEO remains a measure of corporate control that is 
important in divestiture decisions for shareholders of South African firms. Weisbach (1995) 
argues that new CEO’s are more objective in the decision to sell or spin-off non-performing 
business units or assets than CEOs who are already in the employ of sample firms. 
Additionally, Hillier et al. (2009) suggest that as a response to decreases in agency costs of 
managerial discretion, corporate control threats can lead to divestitures. These may occur in 
the form of explicit threats to managerial control. Managers can then use divestitures to 
decrease risks associated with the managerial labour market (as per Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 
1997), the takeover market (as per Martin & McConnell, 1991; Zweibel, 1996), lender 
monitoring (as per Jensen, 1986) and product market competition (as per Hart, 1983).  
 
Logit regressions also confirm that ROA is a statistically significant determinant of 
divestitures for firms in South Africa (significant at the 0.05 level). Findings are in line with 
univariate tests conducted in section 4.2.1. Additionally, findings are consistent with studies 
conducted by Berger and Ofek (1992;) Lasfer et al. (1996;) and Hillier et al (2009) who 
report that firm efficiency is a statistically significant determinant of divestitures. Findings 
suggest that management and shareholders of the firm would exit non-performing segments 
through the use of divestitures, with the intention of improving the firm’s efficiency. 
Additionally, exiting non-performing assets can be a signal to market participants that the 
firm intends to improve performance in order to enhance the firm’s value.  
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Finally, long-term leverage (denoted by D-t-A and D-t-E), short-term leverage (denoted by 
the current ratio and the interest coverage ratio), and firm size (denoted by LnTA) did not 
prove to be statistically significant determinants of divestiture decisions in South Africa.  
 
4.2.3 Findings of tests conducted related to determinants of divestitures results 
 
Findings of univariate tests found CEO Turnover, ROA, D-t-A, and D-t-E to be statistically 
significant determinants of divestitures. However, logit regressions only found CEO 
Turnover and ROA to be statistically significant determinants of divestitures. Therefore, 
according to logit regressions, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 of this study can be 
accepted. Findings suggest that enhancing corporate focus and improving the firm’s 
efficiency are statistically significant determinants of divestitures in South Africa. 
 
4.3 Divestitures and Firm Value 
This section discusses findings related to the impact of divestitures on short-term firm value 
in South Africa. To determine the impact of divestitures on short-term firm value, this study 
used the market model according to event study methodology. The study analysed daily 
AARs and CARs which is consistent with methods employed by several studies (Bhana, 
2006; Lehtonen, 2008; Fogh, 2009; Hillier et al., 2009). Findings of the market model are 
presented and discussed in section 4.3.1. Additionally, a test for robustness using BHARs 
was used to determine the validity of results obtained from using the market model. Using 
BHARs as a test for robustness is in line with methods employed by Hillier et al. (2009) and 
Nichols et al. (2014). Findings of BHARs are presented and discussed in section 4.3.2 and 
both methods were used to test the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: 
H0: Divestitures either have no impact or a negative impact on short-term firm value in South 
Africa. 
Ha: Divestitures have a positive impact on short-term firm value in South Africa resulting in 
shareholder wealth enhancement.  
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4.3.1 Analysis of the 5-day event window 
 
Table 4.3.1 Panel A presents ARs for the 5-day event window and Table 4.3.1 Panel B 
present descriptive statistics of ARs for the entire sample. 
 
Table 4.3.1 Panel A: AARs and CARs for the 5-day (-2;+2) event window  
Panel A CARs and AARs for the sample portfolio 
Event Day AAR Test Statistic CAR 
-2 0.8030% 1.38 0.8030% 
-1 1.0794% 1.86* 1.8824% 
0 0.5785% 1.00 2.4609% 
+1 -0.6952% -1.20 1.7657% 
+2 -1.6341% -2.82*** 0.1317% 
*;**;*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Statistical significance is based on 120 
degrees of freedom for the estimation window between t-151 and t-31. Test statistics were calculated according 
to methods employed by Brown and Warner (1980), and are consistent with methods employed by Miles and 
Rosenfeld (1983;) and Bhana (2006). 
 
Table 4.3.1 Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the 5-day (-2;+2) event window  
Panel B CARs and AARs for the sample portfolio 
 Median % 
positive 
Variance of 
Returns 
25% 75% 
Abnormal Return day t - 2 0.3081% 60.87% 0.1547% -0.2978% 1.0168% 
Abnormal Return day t - 1 -0.1112% 45.65% 1.5744% -0.5914% 1.5992% 
Abnormal Return day t -0.0049% 47.83% 0.3378% -0.7679% 0.8857% 
 
     
Abnormal Return day t + 1 -0.5781% 36.96% 0.1061% -1.4550% 0.3101% 
Abnormal Return day t + 2 -0.1038% 45.65% 1.0776% -0.9521% 0.4007% 
 
Table 4.3.1 Panel A shows that divesting (sample) firms reported CARs of 0.1317% during 
the 5-day event window with results proving to be significant at the 0.01 level. Results 
support findings of studies conducted in South Africa which report that divestitures have a 
positive effect on shareholders of South African firms in the short-term (Blount & Davidson, 
1996; Bhana, 2006). However, findings do not agree with Joosub et al. (2017) who report that 
divestitures have a negative effect on shareholders in South Africa over the short term. Table 
4.3.1 Panel A also reports that CARs increased between day t-2 and day t-1, suggesting that 
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market participants anticipating a divestiture announcement, view divestitures in a positive 
manner as begin to absorb information in trading activity related to an impending 
announcement. Additionally, Table 4.3.1 Panel B reports that the number of companies 
reporting positive ARs constituted a large percentage of the sample portfolio in the days 
preceding the divestiture announcement. Table 4.3.1 shows that 60.87% of firms in the 
sample portfolio had positive returns on day t-2, 45.65% of firms in the sample portfolio 
reported positive returns on day t-1, and 47.83% of firms in the sample portfolio reported 
positive returns on the day of the divestiture announcement. Following the announcement 
date markets began to absorb all information related to the divestiture announcement and 
ARs began to decline; however, divestitures had a positive impact on firm value during the 
primary event window.  Results are also consistent with findings from prior research 
conducted in developed markets which provide evidence of the positive effects of divestitures 
on short-term firm value (Alexander et al., 1984; Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999; 
Sudarsanam & Qian, 2007; Lehtonen, 2008; Fogh, 2009; Hillier et al., 2009; Owen et al., 
2010; Nguyen, 2013; Dahlum & Tai, 2015). However, findings do not agree with Murray 
(2000) who reported that divestitures have a negative impact on firm value. Results of this 
study also support findings from studies which report that divestitures positively impact firm 
value in other developing markets (Sin & Ariff, 2006; Zakaria & Arnold, 2010; Sun, 2012).  
 
The study also investigated the effects of divestitures on short-term firm value by using 
alternative event windows of 3 days and 6 days. Event windows reported ARs of 0.9628% 
percent (significant at the 0.10 level on day t-1) and 2.2180% (significant at the 0.10 level on 
day t-1), for the 3-day and 6-day event window, respectively. Results from both alternative 
event windows support findings reported for the primary event window of 5 days and support 
the view that some market participants still view divestitures as positive NPV projects 
(Dahlum & Tai, 2015). Finally, the study also reported ARs using a 21-day event window
5
. 
The study reported ARs of -3.0148% (significant at the 0.05 level) for the 21-day event 
window. Findings from an extended event window to 21 days found that divestitures can 
result in an erosion of shareholder wealth over a longer period. These results are consistent 
with findings by Nichols et al. (2014) who find that divestitures lead to an erosion of 
shareholder wealth in the long term for South African shareholders. 
4.3.2 Robustness test 
                                                          
5
 Detailed results of AARs and CARs for the 6-day (-5;0), 3-day (-1;+1) and 21-day (-
10;+10) event windows are provided in App. III-C (pg. 101-103). 
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Testing the robustness of results obtained in section 4.3.1 was conducted by determining 
BHARs. This method is consistent with studies conducted by Bhana (2006) and Nichols et al. 
(2014).  
 
4.3.2.1 Buy-And-Hold Returns 
 
Table 4.3.2: Buy-And-Hold Returns (BHAR) for the 5-day (-2;+2) event window  
Panel A BHARs for the sample portfolio 
Event Day Cumulative BHAR  Test Statistic Daily Average BHAR 
-2 0.7189% 1.22 0.7189% 
-1 2.7315% 3.41*** 2.0126% 
0 3.5094% 1.32 0.7779% 
+1 3.0171% -0.83 -0.4923% 
+2 1.5466% -2.49** -1.4705% 
*;**;*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 4.3.2 shows that BHARs for the sample portfolio reported ARs of 1.5466% (significant 
at the 0.05 level) for the 5-day event window. Results support findings from the market 
model discussed in section 4.3.1. Results also confirm that divestitures have a positive impact 
on short-term firm value in South Africa. Additionally, BHARs for the 3-day and 6-day event 
window reported ARs of 2.2982% (significant at the 0.01 level on day t-1), and 3.7410% 
(significant at the 0.01 level on day t-1), respectively. These results also support findings 
obtained using the market model which are discussed in section 4.3.1 and are consistent with 
findings from Bhana (2006). Finally, the 21-day event window reported ARs of -1.2581% 
(significant at the 0.10 level) which are in line with returns using the market model
6
. 
 
4.3.3 Findings of tests conducted related to divestitures and firm value 
CARs for the 5-day, 3-day and 6-day event windows using the market model report that 
divestitures possess a statistically significant positive impact on short-term firm value. 
Additionally, findings of the 5-day, 3-day and 6-day event windows using BHARs also show 
that divestitures possess a statistically significant positive impact short-term on firm value. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted.  
                                                          
6
 Detailed results of BHARs for the 6-day (-5;0), 3-day (-1;+1) and 21-day (-10;+10) event 
window are provided in App. III-C (pg. 101-103). 
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4.4  Determinants of Divestiture Returns 
This section seeks to provide an understanding of the determinants of divestiture returns in 
South Africa. The study uses regressions based on the overall sample portfolio to determine 
which variables have an effect on divestiture returns in South Africa. However, this section 
also compares ARs based on subsamples of the original portfolio to test whether firm 
efficiency, size, and leverage have an effect on divestiture returns in South Africa. Section 
4.4.1 presents and discusses findings from cross-sectional regressions conducted. Section 
4.4.2 presents and discusses findings from subsamples of the original sample portfolio used 
to investigate the effects on firm size, efficiency, and leverage on divestiture returns. 
  
4.4.1 Cross-sectional regression analysis 
A cross-sectional regression was conducted in line methods employed by Hillier et al. (2009;) 
Dahlum and Tai (2015;) and Nguyen (2013). Table 4.4.1 discusses findings from cross-
sectional regression tests conducted used to test the following hypothesis
7
:  
 
 Hypothesis 3:  
H0: Efficiency, firm size or leverage in the year prior to the divestiture are not statistically 
significant determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. 
Ha: Efficiency, firm size or leverage in the year prior to the divestiture are statistically 
significant determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. 
 
Table 4.4.1: Cross-sectional regression analysis – Determinants of Divestiture returns  
 Estimated coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.00935 
(0.64) 
0.01187 
(2.50)** 
0.02236 
(11.10)*** 
0.03547 
(1.35) 
 
ROAt-1 -0.00047 
(-1.21) 
-0.01075 
(-1.51) 
  
Debt to Assetst-1 -0.05101  -0.04753  
                                                          
7
 OLS regressions were conducted using EViews Version 10 Student Version Lite. For 
detailed results see App. III-E (pg. 105-106). 
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(-3.80)*** (-7.32)*** 
Ln(TA)t-1 0.00090 
(0.92) 
 
  -0.00153 
(-0.83) 
R
2 0.94 0.29 0.87 0.21 
*;**;*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The table reports results of OLS 
regressions using White’s correction which tests robust standard errors as the best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE). T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 4.4.1 reports that D-t-A is the only statistically significant determinant of divestiture 
returns in South Africa (significant at the 0.01 level). These findings are consistent with 
Nguyen (2013) who argues that leverage is a statistically significant determinant of 
divestiture returns. Table 4.4.1 reports that firm efficiency and firm size did not prove to be 
statistically significant determinants of divestiture returns. However, to provide greater 
insight related to the determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa, section 4.4.2 
conducted a further analysis by comparing ARs between subsample of the original sample 
portfolio.  
 
4.4.2 Comparisons of abnormal returns between subsamples 
Section 4.4.2 presents and discusses findings related to comparisons of ARs conducted using 
subsamples of the original sample portfolio. Table 4.4.2 Panel A compares the ARs of firms 
with lower levels of efficiency and the ARs of firms with higher levels of efficiency. Table 
4.4.2 Panel B compares the ARs of smaller firms with the ARs of larger firms and Table 
4.4.2 Panel C compares the ARs of highly-levered firms with the ARs of firms with lower 
levels of leverage.  
 
4.4.2.1 Comparison of abnormal returns between subsamples - Testing the Efficiency Effect 
Hillier et al. (2009) argue that firms with lower levels of efficiency benefit more from 
divestitures than firms with higher levels of efficiency. Efficiency is measured by the sample 
firm’s ROA in the year preceding the divestiture announcement. Table 4.4.2 Panel A presents 
CARs and AARs of between firms with lower efficiency and firms with higher efficiency 
taken from the portfolio of divesting firms. These were used to test the following hypothesis: 
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 Hypothesis 3(a):  
H0: Firms with higher ROAs in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
Ha: Firms with lower ROAs in South Africa report superior divestiture returns 
 
Table 4.4.2 Panel A: CARs and AARs of firms with lower efficiency vs. firms with 
higher efficiency 
Panel A: Efficiency   Return on Assets Mean =6.08% (full sample = 46 
observations ) 
 High-efficiency firms Low-efficiency firms  
  Subsample 1 (N=16) Subsample 2 (N=30)   
Event 
Day 
CAR AAR CAR AAR CAR  
(H-L) 
t-statistic 
t-2 0.8653% 
(-0.01) 
0.8653% 
(0.85) 
0.7697% 
(-0.02) 
0.7697% 
(1.12) 
0.0956% 0.10 
t-1 -1.7911% 
(0.03) 
-2.6564% 
(-2.60) 
3.8416% 
(-0.09) 
3.0719% 
(4.46)*** 
-5.6327% -3.25*** 
t -1.6314% 
(0.03) 
0.1597% 
(0.16) 
4.6435% 
(-0.11) 
0.8019% 
(1.16) 
-6.2749% -4.56*** 
t+1 -1.1810% 
(0.02) 
0.4504% 
(0.44) 
3.3373% 
(-0.08) 
-1.3061% 
(-1.89) 
-4.5184% -3.67*** 
t+2 -4.8562% 
(0.08) 
-3.6752% 
(-3.59)*** 
2.7919% 
(-0.05) 
-0.5455% 
(-0.53) 
-7.6481% -2.00* 
***;**;* denotes significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values are determined assuming 
equal unknown variances as per Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). This test is appropriate under the assumption that 
we are dealing with independent random samples from two normal populations having the same unknown 
variance. The t-value with 44 degrees of freedom is presented in parentheses and the formula for obtaining test 
statistics is provided in App. III-F (p. 107). 
 
Table 4.4.2 Panel A shows that firms with lower efficiency reported superior ARs (2.7919%) 
than firms with higher levels of efficiency (-4.8562%). Findings are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level on the day of the announcement and significant at the 0.10 level 2 days after 
the divestiture announcement. Findings suggest that firms with lower levels of efficiency 
relative to their peers benefit more from divestitures. Findings also suggest that firms with 
lower levels of efficiency would be aware that divestitures can be a form of improving the 
firm’s efficiency that can lead to an enhancement in shareholder wealth.  
4.4.2.2 Comparison of abnormal returns between subsamples - Testing the Size Effect 
Dahlum and Tai (2015) argue that smaller firms report superior divestiture returns than larger 
firms. To measure firm size, the firm’s Ln(TA) in the year preceding the divestiture 
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announcement was used as a proxy for the size of the firm. Table 4.4.2 Panel B presents 
CARs and AARs between larger firms and smaller firms taken from the portfolio of divesting 
firms. These were used to test the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 3(b):  
H0: Larger firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns.  
Ha: Smaller firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
 
Table 4.4.2 Panel B: CARs and AARs of larger and smaller firms  
Panel B: Size  Ln(TA) Mean = 15.03 (N=46 observations) 
 Larger Firms Smaller firms  
  Subsample 1 (N=40) Subsample 2 (N=6)   
Event 
Day 
CAR AAR CAR AAR CAR  
(L-S) 
t-statistic 
t-2 0.8601% 
(-0.02) 
0.8601% 
(1.37) 
0.4225% 
(-0.01) 
0.4225% 
(0.31) 
0.4375% 0.34 
t-1 2.1531% 
(-0.06) 
1.2931% 
(2.05) 
0.0779% 
(0.00) 
-0.3447% 
(-0.25) 
2.0753% 0.84 
T 3.2138% 
(-0.09) 
1.0607% 
(1.68) 
-2.5584% 
(0.03) 
-2.6362% 
(-1.94) 
5.7722% 2.90*** 
t+1 2.4792% 
(-0.07) 
-0.7346% 
(-1.17) 
-2.9910% 
(0.04) 
-0.4326% 
(-0.32) 
 
5.4702% 3.14*** 
t-+2 2.3200% 
(-0.06) 
-0.1593% 
(-0.25) 
-14.4571% 
(0.39) 
-11.4661% 
(-18.20)*** 
16.7771% 3.02*** 
***;**;* denotes significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values are determined assuming 
equal unknown variances as per Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). This test is appropriate under the assumption that 
we are dealing with independent random samples from two normal populations having the same unknown 
variance. The t-value with 44 degrees of freedom is presented in parentheses and the formula for obtaining test 
statistics is provided in App. III-F (p. 107). 
 
Table 4.4.2 Panel B shows that smaller firms reported negative ARs of 14.4571% from 
divestitures and larger firms reported gains of 2.3200% from divestitures. Findings were 
significant at the 0.01 level on the day of the announcement and 2 days post the divestiture 
announcement. However, findings are not in line with arguments by Dahlum and Tai (2015), 
suggesting that this phenomenon may be unique to South Africa. Results suggest that 
divestitures by larger firms in South Africa are seen in a positive light than divestitures by 
smaller firms. Reasons could include that larger firms in South Africa may have longer 
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operating periods which can result in market participants having more certainty that if the 
divestiture’s intended result of improving firm value does not occur; the parent firm can 
rebound from a transaction that has a negative impact on firm value. Alternatively, larger 
firm may have more diverse revenue streams than smaller firms and if the divestiture does 
not have the intended effect of enhancing firm value, the large parent may be able to rebound 
from a negative transaction. 
 
4.4.2.3 Comparison of abnormal returns between subsamples - Testing the Leverage Effect 
Nguyen (2013) argues that firms with higher leverage levels report superior divestiture 
returns than lower-levered firms. For the purposes of this study, leverage is defined as the 
firm’s D-t-A in the year preceding the divestiture announcement. Table 4.4.2 Panel C 
presents CARs and AARs between highly-levered firms and firms with lower levels of 
leverage taken from the portfolio of divesting firms. These were used to test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 3(c):  
H0: Lower-levered firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
Ha: Highly-levered firms in South Africa report superior divestiture returns. 
 
Table 4.4.2 Panel C: CARs and AARs of highly-levered and lower-levered firms 
Panel C: Leverage Debt to Assets Mean = 0.17 (full sample = 46 observations ) 
 Highly-leveraged firms Lower-leveraged firms  
  Subsample 1 (N=5) Subsample 2 (N=41)   
Event 
Day 
CAR AAR CAR AAR CAR  
(H-L) 
t-statistic 
t-2 1.6902% 
(-0.02) 
1.6902% 
(1.11) 
0.6948% 
(-0.02) 
0.6948% 
(1.15) 
0.9954% 
 
0.71 
t-1 4.3721% 
(-0.05) 
2.6818% 
(1.76) 
1.5788% 
(-0.04) 
0.8840% 
(1.46) 
2.7932% 1.04 
T 5.7733% 
(-0.06) 
1.4012% 
(0.92) 
2.0570% 
(-0.06) 
0.4781% 
(0.79) 
3.7163% 1.73* 
t+1 2.7796% 
(-0.03) 
-2.9937% 
(-1.97) 
1.6421% 
(-0.05) 
-0.4149% 
(-0.69) 
1.1375% 0.61 
t+2 2.1658% 
(-0.02) 
-0.6138% 
(-0.40) 
-0.1164% 
(0.00) 
-1.7585% 
(-1.16) 
2.2822% 0.38 
***;**;* denotes significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values are determined assuming 
equal unknown variances as per Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). This test is appropriate under the assumption that 
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we are dealing with independent random samples from two normal populations having the same unknown 
variance. The t-value with 44 degrees of freedom is presented in parentheses and the formula for obtaining test 
statistics is provided in App. III-F (p. 107). 
 
Table 4.4.2 Panel C shows that highly-levered firms report ARs of 2.1658% and lower-
levered firms report ARs of negative 0.1164%. Results of ARs between highly-levered and 
lower-levered firms were significant at the 0.10 level on the day of the announcement. 
Findings are consistent with Nguyen (2013) who argues that highly-levered firms benefit 
more from divestitures than firms with lower levels of leverage and that shareholders of 
highly-levered firms view divestitures as a form of unlocking value. Results in Table 4.4.2 
Panel C suggest that divesting firms would exit non-performing business units or assets 
which have a negative impact on the firm’s overall financial health. Proceeds received from 
divestitures can then be allocated to repaying existing debt on the firm’s balance sheet, or 
divestiture proceeds can be allocated to projects which create value for the firm.  
 
4.4.3 Findings of tests conducted related to determinants of divestitures returns 
Section 4.4 conducted statistical tests to determine the determinants of divestiture returns. 
Cross-sectional regressions found that only leverage has a statistically significant effect on 
divestiture returns. Therefore, for hypothesis 3 the null hypothesis which states that leverage, 
firm size and efficiency do not have an effect on divestiture returns cannot be accepted. 
Section 4.4.2 conducted tests to compare ARs using subsamples of the original sample 
portfolio. Section 4.4.2.1 found that firms with lower levels of efficiency reported superior 
divestiture returns that firms with higher levels of efficiency. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
for hypothesis 3(a) which states that firms with higher levels of efficiency report superior 
divestiture returns cannot be accepted. Section 4.4.2.2 found that larger firms reported 
superior divestiture returns than smaller firms, therefore, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 
3(b) which states that larger firms report superior divestiture returns was accepted. Section 
4.4.2.3 found that highly-levered firms reported superior divestiture returns than lower-
levered firms, therefore, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 3(c) which states that lower-
levered firms report superior divestiture returns cannot be accepted.   
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Divestitures continue to be an important process which companies in South Africa can use for 
enhancing firm value. Companies in South Africa continue to use divestitures as a means of 
enhancing firm efficiency, increasing corporate focus and improving the financial health of 
the firm. From a theoretical standpoint, research related to corporate divestitures remains an 
important focus area for scholars that look to understand the impact of divestitures on firm 
value in South Africa. The impact of divestitures on firm value also remains an important 
topic for shareholders and managers in South Africa looking to understand the benefits of 
divestitures on their firms. Therefore, this study aimed to provide an understanding of; (i) the 
determinants of divestitures for South African companies, (ii) the impact of divestitures on 
short-term firm value for South African shareholders, and (iii) what the determinants of 
divestiture returns are for South African firms. In order to assess the determinants of 
divestitures and divestiture returns in South Africa, this study focused on voluntary 
divestitures related to 46 sell-offs and spin-offs of companies listed on the JSE between 2000 
and 2014. 
 
5.1 Summary of findings and relevance of the study  
Logit regressions reported that CEO Turnover, a measure of corporate focus, and ROA, a 
measure of firm efficiency, to be statistically significant determinants of divestitures in South 
Africa. However, sales growth (a measure of corporate focus), ROE (a measure of firm 
efficiency), D-t-A, D-t-E, the current ratio, and the interest coverage ratio (all measures of 
leverage) proved not to be statistically significant determinants of divestitures in South 
Africa. Findings suggest that corporate focus theories related to CEO Turnover, which argue 
that the incumbent CEO is more apprehensive in selling any non-performing assets or 
business units are evident in South Africa. The decision not to sell or spin-off these assets 
would result in the firm losing out on benefits associated with any refocusing programmes. 
Shareholders can decide to exercise their voting powers by replacing the incumbent CEO 
with a new CEO in order to take advantage of the “new CEO effect”. According to the “new 
CEO effect”, a new CEO views the firm’s operations in an objective manner and is more 
inclined to sell any non-performing divisions or assets which no longer possess a strategic fit 
with the firm’s overall financial strategy (Denis & Shome, 2005). 
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The study also found that the firm’s ROA remains an important determinant of divestitures. 
Findings support efficiency theories which argue that divestitures can be an important process 
that companies can use to enhance firm value. Shareholders can use the firm’s ROA as a 
financial metric that indicates how the firm utilises its asset base to generate returns that 
enhance the firm’s value. If the firm’s ROA continues to be lower than what shareholders 
require, shareholders can use this metric as a form of implementing restructuring programmes 
that include divestitures. Additionally, improving any negative synergies that are present in 
the firm can enhance overall operational performance which can lead to improvements in 
firm value (Owen et al., 2010). 
 
The study also found that divestitures have a positive impact on short-term firm value that is 
statistically significant. Findings are consistent with studies conducted in both developed and 
Asian markets. Additionally, findings are consistent with studies conducted in South Africa 
which report that divestitures have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (Blount & 
Davidson, 1996; Bhana 2006; Lugisani, 2010). Findings suggest that selling non-performing 
assets or segments in the firm can result in enhancements to shareholder’s personal wealth. 
Findings also suggest that divestitures can also reduce any employment risk for managers of 
the firm. Managers can use findings from this study as a way of motivating restructuring 
programmes that use divestitures to improve the firm’s value. Shareholders can also use 
findings from this study to gain a better understanding of the impact of divestitures on firm 
value, should they be wary of using divestitures as a form of creating value. 
 
The study also investigated the determinants of divestiture returns in South Africa. Cross-
sectional regressions only found that leverage (measured by D-t-A) has a statistically 
significant effect on divestiture returns in South Africa. Findings are consistent with a study 
conducted assessing the effects of leverage on divestiture returns for shareholders of French 
firms (Nguyen, 2013). The study also found that efficiency (measured by ROA) and firm size 
(measured by LnTA), do not have a statistically significant effect on divestiture returns. 
However, in order to further understand the effects of firm efficiency, size, and leverage on 
divestiture returns the study went further by observing ARs based on subsamples of the 
original sample portfolio. The study found that firms with lower levels of efficiency reported 
superior ARS than firms with higher efficiency levels. Findings are consistent with a study 
conducted by Hillier et al. (2009). The study also found that highly-levered firms reported 
superior ARs than firms with lower leverage levels. Findings are consistent with Nguyen 
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(2013). Finally, this study found that larger firms report superior ARs than smaller firms. 
However, these findings do not agree with a study conducted by Dahlum and Tai (2015). 
Findings related to firm size indicate that South Africa has a unique operating environment 
that views divestitures by larger firms with more enthusiasm than divestitures by smaller 
firms. 
  
5.2 Limitations to the study 
The study used event study methodology according to Fama et al. (1969). A key assumption 
of this approach is that markets operate in an efficient manner. However, markets may not 
always operate efficiently in the “real-world”. Additionally, event study methodology may 
not isolate the benefits of divestitures. Event study methodology only reports short-run 
estimates which can be sensitive to any changes in the design of a research study which looks 
to identify the impact of divestitures on shareholder wealth (Jordan, 2012). Another limitation 
encountered in the study relates to obtaining divestiture transaction information. As there is 
no central repository for information related to divestitures in South Africa, this study used 
multiple sources, such as JSE Sens announcements to confirm whether transactions provided 
by service providers were indeed divestitures. 
 
A further limitation encountered in this study relates to firm size. This study used the firm’s 
Ln(TA) as a proxy for firm size. Dang and Li (2018) argue that different proxies for size 
capture different effects related to firm size. Measures such as enterprise value (market 
capitalisation plus net debt); the number of employees, total profits or net assets (TA less TL) 
could have been used as proxies for firm size. Using these measures as a proxy for firm size 
would alter statistical tests related to the determinants of divestiture transactions and 
matching (control) firms used for the purposes of this study. However, Griffin and Mahon 
(1997) and Dang and Li (2018) argue that Ln(TA) can be used as a proxy for firm size. 
Finally, South African firms often possess corporate structures which involve business 
activities in several sectors. Therefore, choosing the correct control firm proved to be a 
difficult process. 
 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
Research related to divestitures in South Africa remains minimal. This leaves much room for 
scholars to explore and expand on the body of knowledge. First, the observation period of 
this study ended in 2014. Therefore, a more recent observation can be used to investigate the 
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impact of divestitures on firm value. Second, this study combined both forms of divestitures 
in the sample portfolio. Therefore, studies can investigate the impact of spin-offs and sell-offs 
separately to determine which form of divestitures have a greater impact on short-term 
shareholder wealth. 
 
Third, potential research may focus on further extending the determinants of divestiture 
announcements. Studies may only focus on understanding the effects of governance factors 
on the divestiture decision. A study of this nature would follow research conducted by Owen 
et al. (2010) and could include corporate governance measures such as; Board size, CEO 
incentive schemes, and Board composition to measure which variable have a statistically 
significant impact on divestiture decisions. Additionally, legislation specific to South Africa 
such as the Competition Act, BBBEE Act, and King reports could be included in a study of 
the effects of governance requirements on divestiture activity. Fourth, studies may also focus 
only on the effects of corporate refocusing programmes on divestiture decisions. Studies of 
this nature would extend the corporate focus variable set used in this study by following 
methods employed by Berger and Ofek (1999). Studies would include measures such as the 
firm’s excess value and financial distress (measured by reductions in dividends or potential 
takeover announcements). 
 
Fifth, studies may also focus only on the effects of changes in legislation related to corporate 
tax on divestiture decisions. Studies of this nature would investigate how changing corporate 
tax have increased divestiture activity in South Africa. Finally, studies may also focus only 
on the effects of leverage as a determinant of divestitures. Studies of this nature would follow 
methods employed by Nguyen (2013). For example, studies may investigate company 
balance sheet compositions over extended periods of time and would investigate whether 
leverage has been reduced on an incremental basis. Such studies could observe leverage 
ratios 5 years pre the announcement and 5 years post the divestiture announcement using a 
method analogous to Nguyen (2013).   
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7.   APPENDICES 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Table I-A: Findings from prior research (ordered chronologically by year published). 
Author 
Year 
published 
Country 
of focus 
Sample size 
Observation 
period (sample 
period covered) 
Event 
window 
Results 
Hite and Owers 1983 USA 123 1963-1981 (-1;0) 3.3*** 
Miles and 
Rosenfeld 
1983 USA 55 1963-1980 (0;1) 3.34*** 
Schipper and 
Smith 
1983 USA 93 1963-1981 (-1;0) 2.84*** 
Alexander, Benson 
and Kampmeyer 
1984 USA 53 1964-1973 (-1;0) 0.13 
Hearth and Zaima 1984  58 1979-1981 101-140 0.0480** 
Montgomery, 
Thomas and 
Kamath 
1984 USA 78 1976-1979 (-12;+12) 0.04 
Rosenfeld 1984 USA 35 1963-1981 (-1;0) 5.56*** 
Jain 1985 USA 1000 1976-1978 (-5;-1) 0.7 
Copeland, 
Lemgruber and 
Mayers 
1987 USA 188 1962-1982 (-1;0) 3.03*** 
Denning 1988 USA 42 1970-1982 (-6;6) 
2.58 (not 
reported) 
Seifert and Rubin 1989 USA 51 1968-1983 (-1;0) 3.26 
Afshar, Taffler and 
Sudarsanam 
1992 UK 178 1985-1986 (-1;0) 0.85 
Ball, Rutherford 
and Shaw 
1993 USA 39 1968-1990 (-1;0) 
2.55(not 
reported) 
Cusatis, Miles and 
Woolridge 
1993 USA 131 1965-1988 12 months 23.1 
Vijh 1994 USA 113 1964-1990 (-1;0) 2.90** 
Allen, Lummer, 
McConnell and 
Reed 
1995 USA 94 1962-1991 (-1;0) 2.15*** 
Michaely and 
Shaw 
1995 USA 9 1981-1988 (-1;1) 
3.19(not 
reported) 
Slovin, Sushka and 1995 USA 37 1980-1991 (0;1) 1.32** 
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Ferraro 
Blount and 
Davidson 
1996 
South 
Africa 
N/A N/A (-60;-1) 1.8 
Johnson, Klein and 
Thibodeaux 
1996 USA 104 1975-1988 (-1;0) 3.96*** 
Seward and Walsh 1996 USA 78 1972-1987 (-1;0) 2.6*** 
Cho and Cohen 1997 USA 50 1983-1987 
(Year-
4;Year 0) 
.-1.8 
(Year 
+1) 
Daley, Mehrotra 
and Sivakumar 
1997 USA 85 1975-1991 (-1;0) 3.4*** 
Berger and Ofek 1999 USA 
404 
announcements 
(107 
diversified 
firms) 
1984-1993 (-1;+1) 0.073* 
Desai and Jain 1999 USA 155 1975-1991 12 months 7.69 
Desai and Jain 1999 USA 144 1975-1991 (-1;1) 3.84*** 
Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam 
1999 USA 118 1978-1993 (-1;1) 3.28*** 
Mulherin and 
Boone 
2000 USA 106 1990-1999 (-1:1) 4.51*** 
Murray 2000 UK 25 1992-1998 (-1;1) -0.19 
McConnell, 
Ozbilgin and 
Wahal 
2001 USA 80 1989-1995 12 months 13.48 
Schauten, 
Steenbeek and 
Wycisk 
2001 UK 23 1989-1996 (-1;1) 
2.13 (not 
reported) 
Haynes, 
Thompson and 
Wright 
2002 UK 132 1985-1993   
Kirchmaier 2003 
Western 
Europe 
48 1989-1999 (-1;1) 5.4*** 
Maxwell and Rao 2003 USA 79 1976-1997 (0;1) 3.59*** 
Bhana 2004 
South 
Africa 
47 1988-1999 12 months 23.2 
Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova 
2004 
Western 
Europe 
156 1987-2000 (-1;1) 2.62*** 
Veld and Veld- 2004 Western 105 1987-2000 12 months 0.65 
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Merkoulova Europe 
Bhana 2006 
South 
Africa 
58 1995-2001 (-5;0) 3.37 
Sin and Ariff 2006 Malaysia 85 1986-2002 (-1;1) 1.80* 
Sudarsanam and 
Qian 
2007 Europe 157 1987-2005 (-1;1) 4.82*** 
Sundarsanam and 
Qian 
2007 Europe 129 1987-2002 12 months -0.06 
Lee and Lin 2008 UK 376 1993-1997 (-1;0) 1.38 
Lee and Lin 2008 UK 376 1993-1997 12 months -7.1 
Lehtonen 2008 Europe 120 1994-2006 (-1;1) 1.83*** 
Rozing 2008 USA 207 1995-2004 3 years  
Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova 
2008 USA 91 1995-2002 (-1;1) 3.07*** 
Fogh 2009 
Europe 
(Denmark) 
61 2003-2009 (-1;0) 1.79 
Hillier, McColgan 
and Werema 
2009 UK 413 1993-2000 (-1;1) 1.125 
Lee and Madhavan 2010  94 studies Prior studies  0.11** 
Owen, Shi and 
Yawson 
2010 USA 797 1997-2005 (-1;+1) 1.570*** 
Zakaria and 
Arnold 
2010 Malaysia 36 1980-2011 (-1;1) 4.99 
Zakaria and 
Arnold 
2010 Malaysia 36 1980-2011 12 months -7.25 
Sun 2012 Taiwan 157 1995-2004 (-1;1) 0.243 
Nguyen 2013 
Europe 
(France) 
775 1990-2010 (-1;1) 0.138 
Nichols, 
Rosenberg, Majoni 
& Mukanjari 
2014 
South 
Africa 
44 1995-2001 -250 -0.88 
Dahlum and Tai 2015 USA 6699 1995-2014 (-1;0) 1.25 
Joosub, Coldwell 
and Jordan 
2017 
South 
Africa 
27 2002-2011 (0,) -12.47 
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Table II-A: Sample firms and their control firm 
# Selling 
Company 
Industry Company 
disposed of 
Declaration 
Date 
Control Firm 
1 Acumen 
Holdings 
Educational Services Adcorp 
Holdings 
11/07/2000 Advtech 
2 Anglo 
American 
PLC 
Mining & Industrials Mondi PLC 
and Ltd 
06/06/2007 African Rainbow 
Minerals 
3 AVI Ltd Consumer Discretionary – 
Food and Beverages 
Consol Ltd 01/17/2005 RCL Foods 
4 Barloworld General Industrials Pretoria 
Portland 
Cement 
5/15/2007 Invicta Holdings 
5 Barloworld General industrials Freeworld 
Coatings 
11/8/2007 Invicta Holdings 
6 Bolton 
Industrial 
Holding 
General Industrials (Bulk 
Transport, footwear 
manufacturing 
Cargo Carriers 11/10/2000 
 
Imperial Holdings 
7 Cadbury 
Schweppes 
Food and Beverages Amalgamated 
Beverage Ind. 
 
10/30/2000 
 
Clover Industries 
8 Comparex Technology Hardware Dimension 
Data 
2/28/2000 Allied Electronics 
(Altron) 
9 Computer 
Configurati
on holdings 
Technology and IT services Mgx Holdings 
Ltd 
 
3/8/2001 
 
Alviva Holdings 
10 Control 
Instruments 
Technology and IT services TELIMATRIX 
LTD 
 
11/7/2007 
 
Alviva Holdings 
11 Fintech Office Electronics National Data 
Systems, 
Alcatel and 
XEROX South 
Africa to 
USKO 
11/17/2000 Allied Electronics 
(Altron) 
12 Gencor Mining &  industrials Sell-off Impala 
Platinum 
4/1/2003 
 
African Rainbow 
Minerals 
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13 Gold Fields 
Ltd 
 
Mining & Industrials Sibanye Gold 1/10/2013 
 
Harmony Gold 
14 Imperial 
Holdings 
Bulk Transport services Eqstra 
Holdings 
3/25/2008 
 
Value Logistics 
15 IProp Real Estate Properties to 
IFour 
5/9/2002 
 
Growthpoint 
Properties 
16 Johnnic 
Holdings 
Media, communication 
entertainment and casinos 
MTN Group 5/12/2003 
 
Caxton Printers and 
Publishers 
17 Kunene 
Technologi
es 
Technology Hardware Siltek 8/15/2000 
 
Alviva Holdings 
18 Kunene 
Technologi
es 
Technology Hardware Grintek Ltd 3/15/2002 Allied Electronics 
(Altron) 
19 Kirchmann-
Hurry Prop 
Real Estate   IProp Holdings 
20 
 
 
 
Labat 
Africa 
Transport, logistics, road, rail, 
associated electronic and 
engineering components. 
Total Client 
Service 
2/29/2008 
 
EOH Holdings 
21 Micor Bulk Transport (container  
leasing, owning) services 
Dna Supply 
Chain Investm 
 
9/7/2000 
 
Imperial Holdings 
22 Mobile 
Industries 
Owning, leasing, managing 
and reselling marine cargo 
containers worldwide, as well 
as related financing activities. 
Trencor Ltd 11/22/2010 
 
Value Logistics 
23 Mondi Paper & packaging MPact Ltd 5/31/2011 
 
Sappi Ltd 
24 Moresport Retailer of primarily sports 
equipment 
Total Sports 
business 
8/21/2000 
 
Mr Price Group 
25 Mvelaphan
da Group  
Mining & Industrials HEALTH 
STRATEGIC 
INV LTD 
 
6/25/2010 
 
Assore Ltd 
26 Mvelaphan
da 
Resources 
Mining & Industrials Gold Fields 12/15/2010 
 
Assore Ltd 
27 Mvelaphan Mining & Industrials Northam 2/9/2011 Assore Ltd 
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da 
Resources 
Platinum Ltd 
 
 
28 Nictus Ltd Through its subsidiary, 
generally focused on furniture 
and equipment 
Nictus 
Holdings NM 
(Namibian 
business) 
8/10/2012 
 
Afrocentric 
Investments 
29 Pentacom 
Holdings 
Specialist Data Reticulation, 
Networking, Environmental 
Control 
and Information Technology 
Systems Integration 
IFusion 4/10/2000 
 
EOH Holdings 
30 Pepkor Clothing Retailer Tradehold Ltd 
 
10/6/2000 
 
Truworths 
International 
31 Randgold 
Exploration 
Mining & Industrials Sale of 
subsidiary to 
Anglo Gold  
04/05/2000 Harmony Gold 
32 Randgold 
Exploration 
Mining & Industrials JCI Ltd 06/07/2010 Harmony Gold 
33 Real Africa 
Holdings 
Entertainment, media and 
casinos 
African Life 
Insurance 
06/30/2000 Sun 
International/South 
Africa 
34 Redefine 
Properties 
Real Estate Arrowhead 
Properties  
10/5/2011 
 
Growthpoint 
Properties 
35 Remgro Ltd General Industrials Transhex Ltd 6/22/2010 
 
Afrocentric 
Investments 
36 Remgro Ltd General Industrials Impala Ltd 6/1/2012 
 
Afrocentric 
Investments  
37 Simmer and 
Jack Mines 
Mining & Industrials Village Main 
Reef 
3/14/2011 Harmony Gold 
38 Streamwork
s 
Industrial IT & Supply chain 
management 
Dna Supply 
Chain Investm 
 
7/11/2001 
 
EOH holdings 
39 Telkom 
SOC SA 
Quasi government Fixed-line 
operator 
Vodacom Ltd 3/4/2009 Cognition Holdings 
40 Tiger 
Brands 
Food & Beverages Adcock 
Ingram 
7/22/2008 Tongaat-Hulett 
41 Tiger 
Brands 
Food & Beverages The Spar 
Group 
9/23/2004 AVI Ltd 
42 Tiger 
Wheels Ltd 
Automotive – Auto Parts Tiger 
Automotive 
12/6/2006 Metair Investments 
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43 Tongaat 
Hulett 
Group 
Limited 
Food & Beverages Hulamin Ltd 5/10/2007 Astral Foods 
44 UCS Group IT business Business 
Connexion 
5/6/2011 
 
EOH Holdings 
45 Western 
Areas 
Mining & Industrials JCI Ltd 
 
10/31/2002 
 
Anglo American 
46 Wooltru Medical Aid resolutions Consolidated 
News 
Agencies 
(CNA) 
15/02/2001 Metrofile Holdings 
 
Table II-B: Variable Definition and Sources 
Model characteristics Definition Source 
Abnormal Returns Calculated using the market model. 
Market model parameters are 
estimated over days (-151;-31), using 
Ordinary Least Squares  
Share prices obtained from I-
Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
and JSE All Share prices 
received from I-Net Bridge 
CARt = -2;+2 5 day cumulative abnormal return 
(%),  
Calculated for each security 
based on the formula (see 
section 3.3) 
   
Corporate Focus   
Sales Growth Sales growth is determined as the 
growth in revenue between 2 years 
preceding the announcement and the 
year prior to the announcement 
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal, 
Financial Statements & 
Datastream 
CEO Turnover Dummy variable. If firm changed 
CEO in period of 12 months prior to 
the announcement and 1 month post 
the announcement. A value of 1 is 
assigned if true and 0 if otherwise. 
Financial Statements and JSE 
Sens announcements 
   
Efficiency Hypothesis   
ROA Return on Assets = Earnings Before 
Interest, Taxation, Depreciation and 
Amortisation in year t-1 divided by 
Book value of Total Assets in year t-
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
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1 
ROE Return on Equity = Profit After Tax 
(Net income) in year t-1 divided by 
Total Equity in year t-1 
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
   
The Size Effect   
LnTA Natural Logarithm of the book value 
of Total Assets in year t-1 
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
   
The Leverage Effect   
Debt to Assets Long Term Debt t-1 divided by Total 
Net Assets t-1 t 
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
Debt to Equity Long-Term Debt t-1 divided by 
Total Equity t-1  
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
Current Ratios A measure of short-term financial 
health. Measured as a Ratio of 
Current Assets to Current Liabilities 
in year t-1 
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
Interest Coverage Ratio Interest Expense divided by Profit 
before Interest and Tax 
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
   
Robustness Tests   
Buy and Hold Returns Returns as per the Buy and Hold 
Return method in Event Study 
methodology 
I-Net Bridge/IRESS terminal 
& Datastream 
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II-C:   South African Economic Cycle 
Figure 2. South Africa Economic Cycle (GDP) 
Source: Trading Economics (World Bank).  Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-
africa/gdp 
 
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
III-A:   Determinants of Divestitures: Test for significance - sample versus control firm. 
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Where: 
                                                 
                                                  
       variance of                           
       variance of                            
     = number of observations in                           
     = number of observations in                            
 
III-B:   Logit regression outputs: Sale as the dependent variable (SPSS) 
 
Table: III-B.1:   Model 1 
Case Processing Summary 
 N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
Sale 0 46 50.0% 
1 46 50.0% 
Valid 92 100.0% 
Missing 0  
Total 92  
Subpopulation 92a  
a. The dependent variable has only one value 
observed in 92 (100.0%) subpopulations. 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept Only 127.539    
Final 95.762 31.777 9 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 81.891 82 .483 
Deviance 95.762 82 .142 
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Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .292 
Nagelkerke .389 
McFadden .249 
Parameter Estimates 
Salea B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
0 Intercept -.043 1.800 .001 1 .981    
Sales growth -.003 .004 .426 1 .514 .997 .988 1.006 
CEO Turnover -2.369 1.226 3.735 1 .053 .094 .008 1.034 
ROA .023 .018 1.592 1 .207 1.023 .988 1.060 
ROE .546 1.068 .262 1 .609 1.727 .213 13.998 
Debt to Equity -.108 .109 .971 1 .324 .898 .725 1.112 
Debt to Assets 1.900 1.871 1.031 1 .310 6.686 .171 261.756 
Current Ratio -.296 .148 3.969 1 .046 .744 .556 .995 
Interest-coverage 
ratio 
.270 .371 .530 1 .467 1.310 .633 2.709 
Ln(TA) .020 .121 .028 1 .866 1.021 .806 1.293 
a. The reference category is: 1. 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 95.763 .001 1 .981 
Sales growth 98.074 2.312 1 .128 
CEO Turnover 101.094 5.332 1 .021 
ROA 97.511 1.749 1 .186 
ROE 96.196 .434 1 .510 
Debt to Equity 97.169 1.407 1 .236 
Debt to Assets 97.831 2.069 1 .150 
Current Ratio 104.123 8.361 1 .004 
Interest-coverage ratio 96.280 .518 1 .472 
Ln(TA) 95.790 .028 1 .866 
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The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final 
model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an 
effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that 
effect are 0. 
 
Table III-B.2: Model 2 
Case Processing Summary 
 N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
Sale 0 46 50.0% 
1 46 50.0% 
Valid 92 100.0% 
Missing 0  
Total 92  
Subpopulation 87a  
a. The dependent variable has only one value 
observed in 87 (100.0%) subpopulations. 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept Only 127.539    
Final 106.690 20.849 5 .001 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 89.075 81 .253 
Deviance 106.690 81 .029 
    
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .203 
Nagelkerke .270 
McFadden .163 
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Parameter Estimates 
Salea B 
Std. 
Error Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
0 Intercept -.500 1.621 .095 1 .758    
CEO 
Turnover 
-2.370 1.103 4.618 1 .032 .094 .011 .812 
ROA .027 .013 4.490 1 .034 1.027 1.002 1.054 
Debt to 
Equity 
-.128 .099 1.656 1 .198 .880 .724 1.069 
Debt to 
Assets 
2.617 1.823 2.061 1 .151 13.692 .384 487.551 
Ln(TA) -.005 .111 .002 1 .963 .995 .800 1.237 
a. The reference category is: 1. 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 106.785 .095 1 .758 
CEO Turnover 113.927 7.237 1 .007 
ROA 113.189 6.499 1 .011 
Debt to Equity 109.249 2.559 1 .110 
Debt to Assets 110.343 3.653 1 .056 
Ln(TA) 106.692 .002 1 .963 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between 
the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by 
omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all 
parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
Table III-B.3: Model 3 
Case Processing Summary 
 N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
Sale 0 46 50.0% 
1 46 50.0% 
Valid 92 100.0% 
Missing 0  
100 
 
Total 92  
Subpopulation 85a  
a. The dependent variable has only one value 
observed in 85 (100.0%) subpopulations. 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept Only 127.539    
Final 113.927 13.612 4 .009 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 86.140 80 .299 
Deviance 113.927 80 .008 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .138 
Nagelkerke .183 
McFadden .107 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Salea B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
0 Intercept .255 1.579 .026 1 .872    
ROA .028 .013 4.834 1 .028 1.028 1.003 1.054 
Debt to 
Equity 
-.133 .100 1.782 1 .182 .875 .719 1.064 
Debt to 
Assets 
3.186 1.835 3.014 1 .083 24.202 .663 883.445 
Ln(TA) -.076 .107 .504 1 .478 .927 .751 1.143 
a. The reference category is: 1. 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 113.953 .026 1 .872 
ROA 120.916 6.989 1 .008 
Debt to Equity 116.520 2.593 1 .107 
Debt to Assets 118.986 5.059 1 .024 
Ln(TA) 114.438 .511 1 .475 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between 
the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by 
omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all 
parameters of that effect are 0. 
 
III-C:   Alternative Event Windows 
 
III-C.1:   Alternative Event Window 1 (-5;0) 
 
Table III-C.1: Empirical results for 6-day event window  
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Average 
Abnormal Returns: 
Robustness Test: Buy-And-Hold Returns 
Day AAR Test statistic CAR Daily 
Average 
BHAR 
Test statistic BHAR 
-5 -0.4984% -0.86 -0.4984% -0.3133% -0.53 -0.3133% 
-4 -0.7009% -1.21 -1.1993% -0.6121% -1.04 -0.9253% 
-3 0.9564% 1.65 -0.2429% 1.1570% 1.96** 0.2316% 
-2 0.8030% 1.38 0.5601% 0.7189% 1.22 0.9505% 
-1 1.0794% 1.86* 1.6396% 2.0126% 3.41*** 2.9631% 
0 0.5785% 1.00 2.2180% 0.7779% 1.32 3.7410% 
*;**;*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Statistical significance is based on 120 
degrees of freedom for the estimation window between -151 and -31. The method for determining the test 
statistic follows Brown and Warner (1980). This method is also consistent with Miles and Rosenfeld (1983;) 
and Bhana (2006). 
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III-C.2:   Alternative Event Window 2 (-1;+1) 
 
Table III-C.2: Empirical results for 3-day event window  
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Average 
Abnormal Returns: 
Robustness Test: Buy-And-Hold Returns 
Day AAR Test statistic CAR Daily 
Average 
BHAR 
Test statistic BHAR 
-1 1.0794% 1.86* 1.0794% 2.0126% 3.41*** 2.0126% 
0 0.5785% 1.00 1.6579% 0.7779% 0.32 2.7905% 
+1 -0.6952% -1.20 0.9628% -0.4923% -0.83 2.2982% 
*;**;*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Statistical significance is based on 120 
degrees of freedom for the estimation window between -151 and -31. The method for determining the test 
statistic follows Brown and Warner (1980). This method is also consistent with Miles and Rosenfeld (1983;) 
and Bhana (2006). 
 
 
III-C.3:   Alternative Event Window 3 (-10;+10) 
 
Table III-C.3: Empirical results for 21-day event window  
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Average 
Abnormal Returns: 
Robustness Test: Buy-And-Hold Returns 
Day AAR Test statistic CAR Daily 
Average 
BHAR 
Test statistic BHAR 
-10 0.1243% 0.21 0.1243% 0.1856% 0.31 0.1856% 
-9 0.1531% 0.26 0.2774% 0.2321% 0.39 0.4177% 
-8 0.2859% 0.49 0.5633% 0.2899% 0.49 0.7075% 
-7 0.2487% 0.43 0.8120% 0.5757% 0.98 1.2832% 
-6 0.4484% 0.77 1.2604% 0.5565% 0.94 1.8397% 
-5 -0.4984% -0.86 0.7620% -0.3133% -0.53 1.5264% 
-4 -0.7009% -1.21 0.0612% -0.6121% -1.04 0.9143% 
-3 0.9564% 1.65 1.0176% 1.1570% 1.96* 2.0713% 
-2 0.8030% 1.38 1.8205% 0.7189% 1.22 2.7902% 
-1 1.0794% 1.86* 2.9000% 2.0126% 3.41*** 4.8028% 
0 0.5785% 1.00 3.4785% 0.7779% 1.32 5.5807% 
103 
 
+1 -0.6952% -1.20 2.7833% -0.4923% -0.83 5.0884% 
+2 -1.6341% -2.82*** 1.1492% -1.4705% -2.49*** 3.6180% 
+3 -0.4794% -0.83 0.6699% -1.2742% -2.16** 2.3438% 
+4 -1.8779% -3.24*** -1.2081% -2.0072% -3.40*** 0.3367% 
+5 -2.7692% -4.77*** -3.9773% -2.3640% -4.01*** -2.0273% 
+6 -0.0141% -0.02 -3.9914% -0.0211% -0.04 -2.0485% 
+7 0.8481% 1.46 -3.1433% 0.8315% 1.41 -1.2170% 
+8 -0.6881% -1.19 -3.8314% -0.8475% -1.44 -2.0644% 
+9 -0.3556% -0.61 -4.1870% -0.2999% -0.51 -2.3644% 
+10 1.1722% 2.02** -3.0148% 1.1062% 1.88* -1.2581% 
*;**;*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Statistical significance is based on 120 
degrees of freedom for the estimation window between -151 and -31. The method for determining the test 
statistic follows Brown and Warner (1980). This method is also consistent with Miles and Rosenfeld (1983;) 
and Bhana (2006). 
 
III-D:   SPSS OLS Regression graphical outputs of 5-day (-2;+2) CARs  
 
Figure 3. Histogram of 5-day (-2;+2) CARs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source – IBM SPSS Version 25. 
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Figure 4. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residual of 5-day (-2;+2) CARs. 
Source: IBM SPSS Version 25. 
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot of 5-day (-2;+2) CARs  
Source – IMB SPSS Version 25. 
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III-E:   Determinants of divestiture returns: EViews - Regression model outputs 
Figure 6. Model 1 - All determinants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : EViews Student Version 10 Student Version Lite. 
 
Figure 7. Model 2 - ROA as the only explanatory variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EViews Student Version 10 Student Version Lite. 
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Figure 8. Model 3 - Debt to Assets as the only explanatory variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source – EViews Student Version 10 Student Version Lite. 
 
Figure 9. Model 4 - Firm Size as the only explanatory variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source – EViews Student Version 10 Student Version Lite. 
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III-F:   Statistical tests for Determinants of Divestiture Returns 
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Where: 
 
                                                               
        
          
 
           
                                         (3.10.2) 
 
Where: 
                                                                                  
      cumulative abnormal returns                                                  
      variance of                                                
      variance of                                                
    = number of observations in subsample                                     
    = number of observations in subsample 2                              
 
